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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)-3(2)(j). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC, 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions or statutes for the issues 
presented by any party to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Statement of Issues on Cross Appeal is set forth at page 44 below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
AND DISPOSITION BELOW. 
This action involves the interpretation of an Easement and Use Agreement 
("Agreement", Tr. Ex. 1) entered into in 1985 as a settlement agreement between Frank 
Gillmor and David K. Richards & Co. The Agreement addressed the use of mountain 
roads on property owned by David K. Richards & Co. in Summit County. The current 
dispute was tried to the District Court in Summit County, the Honorable Robert K. 
Hilder, over six days in March of 2002. Judge Hilder entered his findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in May 2002 (R. 1711) and the Judgment on September 24, 2002. 
(R. 1781.) Rule 59 Motions to Alter or Amend the Judgment were filed on October 8, 
2002 and on October 9, 2002 (R. 1790, 1808), and the Order on those motions was 
entered on April 1, 2003. (R. 1974.) Nadine Gillmor's Notice of Appeal was filed on 
April 25, 2003. David K. Richards & Co., Robin Macey, Ken Macey and Family Link, 
L.L.C. filed Notices of Cross Appeal on April 30, 2003. (R. 1980, 1983.) The appeal 
and cross appeal are from a final judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Parties 
The plaintiff, Nadine Gillmor ("Gillmor"), is the successor in interest to Frank 
Gillmor. Prior to his death in 1995, Frank Gillmor owned land in the upper Weber 
Canyon in Summit County. For many years the Gillmor family used the land as summer 
range for sheep and cattle. (R. 2014, p. 164-65, 170.) Frank Gillmor was one of the 
parties to the Agreement. 
The defendant David K. Richards & Co. ("Richards") owned property adjoining 
Frank Gillmor5 s. Richards is the other party to the Agreement and still owns a portion of 
the property over which the disputed easements run. The balance of the Richards' parcel 
is now owned by Family Link, L.L.C. ("Family Link"), a family entity owned by Ken 
and Robin Macey. Tr. Ex. 338, 339 (R. 2011, p. 867). 
The 1984-1985 Litigation 
The Agreement was reached to settle litigation commenced in 1984 by Frank 
Gillmor. (R. 2014, p. 147.) The suit was filed when Richards challenged the right of 
people hunting on the Gillmor property to use livestock trails called the Perdue Creek 
road and the Neil Creek road that run from the Weber Canyon highway across Richards' 
property up to the Gillmor property. (R. 2011, p. 882-883.) In his lawsuit Frank Gillmor 
claimed a prescriptive easement over the roads. (Complaint, Tr. Ex. 4, R. 2014, p. 194.) 
The Perdue Creek road is the focus of this action and appeal. 
2 
The Agreement was negotiated by attorneys representing Frank Gillmor and 
Richards. James Elegante represented Gillmor and was the primary drafter of the 
Agreement. (R. 2014, p. 197.) The parties began negotiating a settlement in earnest 
shortly before trial was scheduled to begin on November 21, 1985. Several drafts of the 
Agreement were exchanged over the weeks leading to trial. (R. 2014, p. 204-205.) Both 
counsel who participated in the drafting of the Agreement testified at trial, Elegante in 
person and Richards' attorney, H. Ross Workman, by deposition. David K. Richards, the 
principal of David K. Richards & Co., also testified at trial. (R. 2011, p. 857.) 
Frank Gillmor understood during the 1985 negotiations that he was giving up 
some of the rights he claimed in his suit in order to have some assured access. (R. 2014, 
p. 194.) 
Frank Gillmor died prior to the time this action was filed. Nadine Gillmor, who 
married Frank in November of 1984, testified at trial. Although Nadine Gillmor claimed 
to have participated in the direction and prosecution of the 1984 lawsuit, Frank Gillmor's 
attorney, James Elegante, testified that Nadine was not generally with Frank when he and 
Frank discussed the lawsuit. (R. 2014, p. 189.) During arguments on the motions to alter 
or amend the judgment, the trial judge observed: 
. , . And I have great respect for Mrs. Gillmor, but she also made statements 
regarding her involvement in many meetings and negotiations, which I do 
not find to be credible based on the evidence, and I have some issues about 
credibility on her - - the extent of her involvement. So that doesn't carry a 
lot of weight with me in all candor." 
(R. 2007, p. 12.) 
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The Parties Conduct After Settlement 
After the 1984 litigation was settled and prior to Frank's death in 1995, there was 
little disagreement between the Gillmors and Richards relating to the use of the roads. 
During this time, Frank leased his property initially to his cousin, Steve Gillmor, and then 
to his nephew, Luke Gillmor, for use as summer pasture. (R. 2012, p. 526.) 
At the time the Agreement was reached, Frank Gillmor had an arrangement with 
Vern Howard and his sons Tom and Craig and a number of their friends (the "Howard 
group") to put up the fences on his property in the spring and lay down them down in the 
fall and to do other work on the property related to animal husbandry. In exchange, 
Frank gave the Howard group the right to hunt on the Gillmor property during deer 
hunting season. (R. 2012, p. 556.) At the time of the 1984 litigation there was no 
structure on the Gillmor property other than a hunting shack used by the Howard group. 
The shack did not have running water, electricity or a heating system and was not suitable 
for any type of long-term use. (R. 2014, p. 152.) 
Prior to 1981, the hunting shack had been located on a different part of the 
property belonging to Frank Gillmor's father and uncle and was accessed by a different 
road, the White's Creek road. (R. 2012, p. 550,1. 23-25.) The White's Creek road is one 
of several roads, other than the roads at issue here, that lead into the Gillmor property. 
(R. 2012, p. 552; 2011, p. 728-730.) After the larger block of property was partitioned 
(Tr.Ex. 2) between Frank and his relatives, Frank asked the Howards to move the shack. 
(R. 2012, p. 554.) 
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Before the Agreement was signed, on occasion two-wheel motorcycles and a three 
wheel All Terrain Vehicle ("ATV") had been used on the Perdue and Neil Creek roads by 
people going to the Gillmor property, and the noise and dust these created were a 
principal concern of Dave Richards in the 1985 negotiation. (Workman Depo., p. 32-34.) 
Tom Howard bought and used his first four wheel ATV in the Spring of 1985 and Vern 
and Craig, each bought their first four wheel ATV in October, 1985, about one month 
before the Agreement was signed. (R. 2012, p. 564.) 
After the Agreement was signed, Frank instructed the Howards that they were not 
to use their ATVs or motorcycles on the Perdue Creek road. He told them that as part of 
the settlement, they would have to trailer their four-wheel ATVs over Richards' road up 
to the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 561.) 
In the early 1990's Frank Gillmor became dissatisfied with the work of the 
Howard group and told the Howards that he was going to make other arrangements for 
putting up and letting down the fences on his property. (R. 2012, p. 572-573.) Around 
that time he began using Jed Wilde and Lou Stevens and their families to take care of the 
fences. In exchange, like the Howard group, they were allowed to hunt on the property. 
(R. 2012, p. 572; R. 2011, p. 676-677.) 
Events Leading To This Litigation 
Frank Gillmor died in January 1995. Prior to Frank's death, the Gillmors did not 
own or use any three or four-wheel ATVs on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2011, p. 738-
739.) In 1996, Nadine Gillmor's daughter, son-in-law and grandchildren moved back to 
5 
Utah after having lived out of the state for a number of years. They began to use four 
wheel ATVs on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2011, p. 639.) 
Richards sold part of his property to Barry Miller who in 1999 sold a part of the 
property to the Maceys. (Tr. Ex. 338 and 339.) The Maceys began building a summer 
house near the Perdue Creek road in 2000. (R. 2015, p. 1199.) In the fall of 2000, Ken 
Macey saw Nadine Gillmor's son-in-law driving an ATV on Perdue Creek road and told 
him that ATVs should not be driven on the road but should be trailered up to the Gillmor 
property. (R. 2015, p. 1158) Over the Memorial Day weekend of 2001, the Maceys 
stopped several of Nadine Gillmor's grandchildren and their friends, on a total of eight 
ATVs, on the road and told them they should trailer the ATVs up to the Gillmor property. 
In response, Nadine Gillmor commenced this action. (R. 2015, p. 1159.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION 
TO GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF ERROR 
Nadine Gillmor's opening Brief sets up a house of cards and spends 30 pages 
destroying it. This case does not involve a general grant of access, so Gillmor's lengthy 
treatise on the history and attributes of such grants is of little assistance to the Court. 
This case concerns a seven page written Agreement, negotiated through numerous drafts 
by parties represented by counsel. The Agreement grants specific easements for limited 
purposes, and declares: 
The Easements herein granted are granted for the following purposes only 
and shall not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards. (Para. 3, Tr. Ex. 1) 
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Rather than address the entire Agreement between Richards and Frank Gillmor, Nadine 
Gillmor's brief focuses on a single phrase from one of the granting paragraphs, and 
asserts that phrase overrides all of the other language in the Agreement and governs the 
entire relationship between the parties. 
In light of the limited grants of use given to Frank Gillmor in the Agreement, the 
limitations on Gillmor determined by the trial court are correct. Four-wheel ATVs were 
properly barred from use on the easements, and the trial court's decision was supported 
by evidence of the parties' intent. Gillmor failed to marshall the evidence in making her 
attack on certain findings of fact, and the trial court's findings are not clearly erroneous. 
The trial court's decision addressed matters at issue before it, and its judgment does not 
include advisory opinions. The trial court properly denied Gillmor's motion to amend 
her complaint, and her motion for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF ERROR 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO 
INTERPRET THE AGREEMENT, AND GILLMOR'S CLAIMS OF 
ERROR FAIL. 
Gillmor's claims of error ignore the written language of the Agreement as well as 
the contracting parties' intentions in entering into the Agreement. At the heart of all of 
Gillmor's claims of error is her mistaken belief that she is entitled to unfettered rights to 
use the Perdue Creek road. This elaborate house of cards - that the trial court granted her 
"unfettered" and "unlimited" rights of access across Richards' and Maceys' property but 
then saddled her with unwarranted limitations - and the many pages of argument and 
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case law dedicated to support the claim and attack the limitations, ignores the structure, 
language and intent of the Agreement. 
In interpreting the Agreement, the trial court was guided by several key principles 
of contract interpretation. First, contract interpretation requires analyzing the entire 
contract, giving effect to every term. See Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, If 19, 994 P.2d 
193 (Utah 2000) ("[W]e interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable 
expectations of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, 
nature, and purpose of the contract."). Second, a court interpreting an easement may not 
grant license to use the easement outside the limitations actually set forth in the grant 
itself. Labrum v. Rickenbach, 711 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah 1985). Finally, the whole point 
of interpreting the contract is to give effect to the parties' intentions, purposes and 
reasonable expectations in entering into the agreement. SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, 
2001 UT 54,114, 28 P.3d 669, 675 (Utah 2001) (the parties intentions are "controlling"); 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah App. 
1987) (court must consider agreement's purpose in interpreting its terms); Nixon and 
Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Assoc, Inc., 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982) (contracts to be 
construed in light of the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the 
purpose and language of the contract). With these principles in mind, Gillmor's claims of 
error fall. 
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A. The Trial Court Properly Gave Meaning to AH the Terms of the 
Agreement in its Interpretation. 
Getting the cart before the horse, the bulk of Gillmor's arguments rest on the 
fallacious assumption that one clause in paragraph 3 (a), granting Frank Gillmor and 
certain specific family members rights of "vehicular access," now gives Nadine Gillmor 
complete, unfettered and unlimited rights of access over the Perdue Creek road. In 
evaluating Gillmor's points of error, the Court must consider the structure, language, and 
purpose of the Agreement in its entirety. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f 19. 
The Agreement's structure is simple and understandable: Paragraph 1 grants the 
easements, but only "subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained." 
Paragraph 2 describes the recipients of the easements and limits the use of the easements 
to prevent rights of public access. Paragraph 3 describes certain specific purposes that 
define and circumscribe how the easements may be used and makes clear that those uses 
may not be enlarged: 
The Easements herein are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of Richards. 
Paragraph 3 also contains four subparts setting forth permitted uses. Subpart (a) 
grants "vehicular access (ingress and egress)" along Perdue Creek road for three 
purposes: 1) "maintenance work performed on the Gillmor Property"; 2) "by Gillmor and 
his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, and their spouses and 
1
 In Elegante's first draft of the Agreement, he included at the end of this limiting 
sentence the additional language, "which shall not be unreasonably withheld." At 
Richards' insistence, the parties struck the additional language, further emphasizing that 
the easements granted were for limited purposes only. Tr. Ex. 304, 309, 310. 
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children," and 3) "animal husbandry." Subpart (b) grants "general access for animal 
husbandry, including the herding of livestock...." Subpart (c) grants "vehicular access" 
along Perdue Creek road to Gillmor's invitees, "limited to access for maintenance work 
performed on the Gillmor Property. . . and for hunting." Subpart (d) grants vehicular and 
general access across the Neil Creek road "for use in emergency situations only or with 
the permission of Richards." 
Paragraph 4 states that the covenants within the Agreement run with the land. 
Paragraph 5 sets forth maintenance obligations of the parties. Finally, paragraph 6 
establishes further limitations on access for hunting and the kinds of vehicles that can be 
used on the easements. 
Gillmor argues that the Agreement's reference in paragraph 3(a) to "vehicular 
access (ingress and egress)" converts the easement into an "unfettered" right of access. 
This is wishful thinking. Instead, paragraph 3(a) allows access for three purposes only: 
maintenance work, access by Frank Gillmor (and certain family members) and animal 
husbandry. The parties to the Agreement took great care to limit the rights of use 
provided under paragraph 3(a). (R. 2014, p. 195; p. 226.) If a particular use does not fall 
into the categories set forth in 3(a), or other categories set forth in the remaining subparts 
of paragraph 3, then it is expressly not permitted, as the prefatory language of paragraph 
3 makes clear: "for the following purposes only." 
The issue of whether Nadine Gillmor and her children have rights of access 
pursuant to paragraph 3(a) was incorrectly decided by the trial court. This issue is 
addressed below at page 47 in Section I of the arguments on cross appeal. 
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Nowhere is Gillmor's misinterpretation of the Agreement clearer than in her 
argument that her personal right of access includes a right to have invitees use the 
easement. Her argument is flatly inconsistent with paragraph 3(c) where the question of 
invitees is addressed directly. That subpart grants vehicular access to the Gillmor 
property "for Gillmor's invitees," but says, "such access is hereby limited to access for 
maintenance work . . . and for hunting." (Tr. Ex. 1.) 
Finally, the purposes set forth in paragraph 3 remain subject to other restrictions 
set forth in the Agreement, including the restrictions on the number of hunting invitees, 
the number of vehicles and the exclusion of all terrain vehicles in paragraph 6. If 
Gillmor's rights under the Agreement were unfettered rights of ingress and egress, then 
the Agreement, as well as its particularized purposes and limitations, would be 
superfluous. See Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f^ 21 (court should give an interpretation which 
gives an effective meaning to all the terms over an interpretation which leaves a part with 
no effect). The trial court correctly applied principles of contract interpretation in 
refusing to declare that Gillmor's rights under the Agreement were unfettered or 
unlimited. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Refused to Permit Any Use Not Granted by 
the Agreement. 
Gillmor's house of cards also rests on the erroneous assertion that her rights 
extend to any use not specifically prohibited by the Agreement. This is clearly incorrect. 
The Utah Supreme Court has explicitly stated that "[a] right of way founded on a deed or 
grant is limited to the uses and extent fixed by the instrument." Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227; 
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see also Wycoffv. Barton, 646 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1982); accord Kikta v. Hughes, 766 
P.2d 321, 323 (N.M. App. 1988) (owner of dominant estate "cannot change the extent of 
the easement or subject the servient estate to an additional burden not contemplated by 
the grant of easement. . ."); Steil v. Smith, 901 P.2d 395, 396 (Wyo. 1995) (where an 
easement is claimed under a grant, the extent of the right depends on its terms). Thus, the 
only permitted uses of the easement are those actually set forth in the Agreement. 
Gillmor is not entitled to general rights of ingress and egress because the 
Agreement itself limits the purposes, users and manner of using the easement. Thus, all 
of the cases cited by Gillmor in support of her claim of an unfettered right of access are 
irrelevant because either they discuss grants of access that were unlimited by their terms 
or they recognize the principle that the grant itself may limit the holder's rights. See 
Shingleton v. North Carolina, 133 S.E.2d 183, 184-187 (N.C. 1963) (discussing an 
unlimited conveyance); Davis v. Jefferson Cty. Tele. Co., 95 S.E. 1042, 1044 (W.Va. 
1918) (discussing right of way granted "without limit of use"); River City Resort, Inc. v. 
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., No. E1999-02567-CO4-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 1, at 
*5 (Tenn. App. Jan. 3, 2001) (discussing lack of "limitation" in conveyance), cert, 
denied, 2001 Tenn. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. May 21, 2001); Bowers v. Myers, 85 A. 860, 861 
(Pa. 1912) (discussing grant expressed in "general terms"); Chevy Chase Land Co. v. 
United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1074 (Md. App. 1999) ("The language of the easement can 
grant to the easement holder a good deal of discretion in the use of the easement or limit 
the use very narrowly . . .".) (emphasis added.). 
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Gillmor argues that the only limitation upon her use is the common law legal 
principle that the user of an easement cannot create or increase the burden on the land. 
She then claims that because the trial court made no finding of increased burden, there 
should be no limitations. Gillmor Brief at 32. This argument fails. Analyzing whether 
any particular use creates an additional burden is the second part of the analysis; the 
primary part is an analysis of the limitations contained in the grant. Any use that violates 
the limitations set forth in the Agreement would, by definition, constitute an increase in 
the burden on the servient estate. The cases Gillmor cites in support of her proposition 
that an increase of burden on the servient estate is the only limitation on use of an 
easement, Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 
431 (Utah 1993); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah 
1946), are inapposite because they do not address express easements or grants of limited 
rights of use. 
The trial court's conclusion that paragraph 3(a)'s grant of vehicular access to 
"Frank Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity, and their 
spouses and children" is "unfettered by any restriction as to the purpose of the access," 
(R. 1721) does not magically extinguish all of the restrictions in the Agreement. 
Although Frank Gillmor may have been able to use the Perdue Creek road personally to 
get to his property and do anything he wanted to do when he got there, the other 
limitations on use of easement remained in place. 
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C. The Trial Court Properly Interpreted the Agreement as a Settlement 
Agreement. 
In an attempt to avoid the limitations set forth in the Agreement, Gillmor argues 
that the Agreement should be construed against Richards as grantor and in Gillmor's 
favor. Gillmor Brief at 25. The Agreement at issue here was not a deed; it was a 
settlement agreement. (R. 2014, p. 149, p. 151.) It is a general rule that ambiguous 
provisions in a settlement agreement should be construed against the drafter of those 
provisions. Cherry v. Utah State Univ., 966 P.2d 866 (Utah App. 1998) (stating general 
rule that ambiguous contracts are construed against the grantor); see Century Fin. Serv.t 
Inc. v. Peach Tree Bancard Corp., No. 91-1914, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8993, at *9 
(E.D. Pa. June 22, 1992); Sulit v. D. Boothe & Co., Nos. 01-3353/01-3354, 2002 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 2362, at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2002). This is the case because settlement 
agreements are construed "in the same manner as any contract." Erdman v. Cochise 
County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9 Cir. 1991). In this case, certain ambiguous provisions 
were properly construed against Gillmor because it was Gillmor's attorney that drafted 
the provisions. (R. 2014, p. 204-205, 213.) 
D. The Trial Court Did Not Reform the Agreement 
In an effort to mischaracterize the trial court's ruling as error, Gillmor asserts the 
court engaged in "reformation" or "re-writing" of the Agreement. In considering and 
ruling upon the facts presented at trial, and in analyzing those facts in light of the 
Agreement, the trial court was not reforming the Agreement. It simply ruled whether, on 
the facts presented, Gillmor was entitled to the extensive rights she claimed, even where 
14 
those rights were not found in the Agreement. This was a critical function of the trial 
court given the strict instruction of paragraph 3 that the purposes of the easements not be 
enlarged without Richards' express consent. 
Gillmor seeks to bolster her legal argument by contending that in 1984 Frank 
Gillmor was entitled to "unfettered" rights to the Perdue Creek road and that these 
unlimited rights of use were carried over to the Agreement. Consideration of the origins 
of the Agreement are helpful here. The 1984 litigation arose because Frank Gillmor did 
not have any express easement over Richard's property. Gillmor sued claiming a 
prescriptive easement based on historical use. (Tr. Ex. 4.) The Agreement was crafted as 
a compromise, with Gillmor conceding on a number of issues to obtain some assured 
access. (Findings of Fact 14, 15; R. 1713, 1714; which are not challenged by Gillmor.) 
Under the Agreement, the manner in which Frank was allowed to use the Perdue 
Creek road (e.g., using an ATV), or who or what he took with him (e.g., invitees, large 
numbers of hunters, family members other than to the first degree of consanguinity, 
construction trucks or supplies, etc.) were limited. The Agreement's specific terms, and 
the evidence at trial made plain that Richards was willing to allow, and Frank Gillmor 
was willing to accept (R. 2014, p. 225, - p. 226), limited use of the Perdue Creek road, 
and that the easements were granted for certain, circumscribed purposes. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT CHALLENGED BY GILLMOR ARE 
CORRECT, 
Nadine Gillmor challenges six findings of fact made by the trial court. A trial 
court's finding of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Young v. Young, 
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1999 UT 38, 979 P.2d 338, 342 (Utah 1999); U.R.C.P. Rule 52(a) ("findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses."). The party challenging a finding of fact must show that the 
material findings are clearly erroneous by marshaling all evidence supporting the 
findings, then showing this evidence is legally insufficient to support the findings when 
viewed in a light most favorable to a trial court's findings. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). A trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are 
so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. 
The marshaling requirement serves the important function of reminding litigants in 
appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Woodward v. 
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991). "After constructing this magnificent array 
of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence. The 
gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's 
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. 
Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991); see also ELM, Inc. v. M.V. Enterprises, Inc., 
968 P.2d 861, 865 (Utah App. 1998) cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). If an 
appellant fails to marshal the evidence properly, appellate courts must assume the 
findings are correct. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 312. 
Findings No. 3 and 4: Gillmor failed to marshal the following evidence which 
also supports Finding No. 3. David Richards testified that he personally observed and 
discussed with Bertagnole his operation on the mountain. (R. 2011, p. 867.) Richards 
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actually leased ground to Bertagnole, saw and discussed Bertagnole's operation with him, 
and based on Richards' observations, Bertagnole usually brought his sheep in through 
White's Creek (a different road than those at issue here). (R. 2011, p. 867.) Richards 
testified that Bertagnole leased ground from him to run sheep and that continued until 
about 1995 or 1996, when Bertagnole sold that band of sheep. (R. 2011, p. 873.) Doc 
Woolstenhulme also testified that in the mid-1980fs, the Bertagnoles were running sheep 
on the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 383, 384, 386.) 
Gillmor did not marshal any evidence, either in support of or contradicting 
Finding No. 4. Finding No. 4 is explicit in that it reflects what Richards was aware of at 
the time he purchased the property. This Finding, so far as what Sheilds had allowed 
Frank Gillmor to do, is directed to Richards' understanding as opposed to the truth of the 
matter and was never challenged by Gillmor. The second to the last sentence in the 
finding is based upon what Richards actually saw and is supported by Richards' 
testimony. R. 2011, p. 873, 874, 877. The last sentence in Finding No. 4 refers to 
Richards' belief, which was not subject to the objection, and is also supported by the 
testimony of Tom Howard who talked about accessing the Gillmor property by the 
White's Creek road (which begins lower in the canyon and does not cross Richards' 
property) (R. 2012, p. 548-550, 553). Tom Howard also testified about accessing the 
Gillmor property from the Chalk Creek or the north side of the Gillmor parcel. (R. 2012, 
p. 601.) Dave Richards knew when the Agreement was being negotiated that Gillmor 
had other access to his property. (R. 2008, p. 951.) 
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Finding No. 18: Gillmor's discussion of the evidence contradicting Finding No. 
18 begins with the assertion that "there is an utter absence of evidence" of the parties 
intent to preclude Gillmor from transporting materials to construct a new cabin on his 
property. (Gillmor Brief, p. 12) This assertion is incorrect. Trial Exhibit 304 was a 
November 1, 1985 draft of the Agreement prepared by Frank Gillmor's counsel, James 
Elegante. That draft contained language in paragraph 2 that provided: 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is acknowledged by 
Richards that one residence may be constructed upon the 
Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such residence 
shall have the right to use the easement for access to such 
residence. 
Trial Exhibits 307 and 310, later drafts of the Agreement dated November 15, 1985 and 
November 20, 1985, again drafted by James Elegante, continue this provision. (R. 2014, 
p. 211, 213, 219.) 
Trial Exhibit 332 is Ross Workman's marked up copy of Elegante's November 
15th draft. Workman and Elegante discussed these changes. (R. 2014, p. 210.) In the 
final draft of the Agreement, the language authorizing Gillmor to use the Perdue Creek 
road to construct the cabin was removed. 
The deletion of language in drafts of an agreement is a significant indication of the 
intention of the parties. In Golden Pacific Bancorp v. FDIC, 273 F.3d 509, 517 (2nd Cir. 
2001), the court stated that the rejection of draft language demonstrates the parties' 
intentions as to their rights under a final agreement. In Butler Produce & Canning Co. v. 
Edgerton State Bank Co., 112 N.E.2d 23, 26 (Ohio 1953), the court held that for purposes 
of explaining ambiguous language in a written contract, a preliminary draft of that 
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contract, which was rejected by the parties, is admissible in evidence and may be 
considered on the question of intent. See also Valley v. Valley, 199 A.2d 93, 94 (N.H. 
1964). 
Gillmor argues, based on Elegante's testimony (R. 2015, p. 1071), that there was 
no negotiation to restrict Frank's right to use Perdue Creek road to construct a new cabin 
on his property. In fact, what Elegante said was that that there was no verbal discussion 
between counsel for Richards and Frank Gillmor about building another cabin. (R. 2014, 
p. 217.) However, Ross Workman, Richards' counsel, specifically recalled a 
conversation about paragraph 2 at the courthouse when the Agreement was signed, in the 
presence of Frank Gillmor, where Frank Gillmor acknowledged that there was no 
residence on his property, and ". . . if my recollection serves me right, residence came out 
and cabin went in" (Workman Depo. p. 23). 
Thus, both the testimony of Richards' attorney and the history of the drafting of 
the Agreement reflect negotiations about using the road to rebuild the cabin. It is clear 
that Richards refused to consent to Gillmor's use of the road for this purpose. 
The issue of the use of the road for construction was also the subject of one of 
Gillmor's post-trial motions. (R. 1812, at 1819.) In prefacing his remarks in ruling upon 
those motions, the trial court made the following observation: 
And perhaps here I should make an observation I should have 
made earlier, and that is, it does not seem to me that Ms. 
Gillmor's motion to a large extent does not accept that this 
was about compromise, it does not accept it was about limited 
use. That was really what was at issue here. 
(R. 2007, p. 20,1.23.) 
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Gillmor's argument against the finding suggests the grant in paragraph 3(a) to 
Frank and his immediate family opens the door to any imaginable use. In effect, Gillmor 
argues that the insertion of the personal right of access in paragraph 3(a) provided a 
stealth card which undercut all of the negotiations leading up to and the provisions of the 
final Agreement. Elegante, the drafter of the provision, never made such a claim. He 
testified that the personal right of access was substituted for language in earlier drafts that 
granted a right of access for "recreation, which shall include, among other things, 
picnicking, camping, hunting and fishing." (R. 2014, p. 230.) Elegante testified that 
Frank Gillmor would not give up his rights to recreation. (R. 2014, p. 176.) Frank liked 
the new language better because it did not limit the kinds of recreation he and his family 
could enjoy. According to Elegante, under the new language "they could fish, they could 
pitch horseshoes, they could put up a tent, they could cut a Christmas tree." R. 2014, 
p. 230.) Elegante never testified that the right of personal access included a right to use 
the easement for construction. In fact, he conceded it was never discussed. (R. 2014, 
p. 217.) 
The trial court accurately captured the essence of this negotiation in the January 8, 
2003 hearing, where he said that Frank and his immediate family could use the easement 
as individuals for whatever purpose they wanted. That unfettered grant, however, did not 
open the door to all of the uses for which the parties had agreed the road would not be 
used. The trial court articulated its rationale as follows (R. 2007, p. 21): 
Here the core of the agreement was a compromise, certain 
historical uses would be permitted and continued, and that did 
not, would not and never could include unfettered access, 
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large numbers, destruction of property, uses and access for 
construction, creating roads from private to public access. . . . 
And I have a huge problem, for example, with the suggestion 
that maybe Ms. Gillmor starts driving away lumber trucks 
and cement trucks and doing the construction. This was not 
intended, this was to be a limited use, and it was to meet some 
very important goals, and I think it met them. 
Finding No. 23. Gillmor makes no effort to marshal evidence in support of this 
finding, instead focusing upon two words in one sentence of the finding. The trial court's 
statement that there was "no evidence" addresses solely the issue of Frank Gillmor's and 
David Richards' awareness of the use of four-wheelers prior to signing the Agreement. 
There are at least three other sentences in the finding which are all supported by 
considerable evidence, none of which Gillmor has made any effort to marshal. 
In her limited attempt to marshal evidence contradicting the single sentence in 
Finding No. 23 about the knowledge of Gillmor and Richards, Gillmor relies extensively 
upon letters mailed by Vern Howard to the Gillmors. This same argument was made in 
the course of post-trial motions and was addressed by the trial court on January 8, 2003. 
(R. 2007.) The letters were referred to in the course of argument, whereat the Court 
interrupted Gillmor's counsel and made the following remarks in response to the 
argument that Mrs. Gillmor had read these letters to Frank Gillmor (R. 2007, p. 12.): 
I think that one particularly, the last point [reading documents 
and papers], goes to the issue of credibility. And I have great 
respect for Mrs. Gillmor, but she also made statements 
regarding her involvement in many meetings and 
negotiations, which I do not find to be credible based on the 
evidence, and I have some issues about credibility on her -
the extent of her involvement. So that doesn't carry a lot of 
weight with me in all candor. 
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The real thrust of this finding is directed to the fact that neither Richards nor 
Gillmor consciously distinguished between three and four wheel ATVs. None of the 
testimony referred to at page 16 of Gillmor's brief supports the notion that Frank was 
aware that four wheelers were being used on the property before the Agreement was 
signed. The picture, Exhibit 58, does not have Frank Gillmor in it. There is nothing to 
suggest that Frank Gillmor was present when the photograph was taken. Similarly, Tom 
Howard's reference to seeing Frank Gillmor up on Perdue Creek road is not in the 
context of whether or not Frank saw them on four-wheelers on the property. Contrary to 
the conclusion Gillmor attempts to reach, there was no evidence in the record that Frank 
Gillmor saw the Howards on four-wheelers on the Perdue Creek road or on the Gillmor 
property prior to the time the 1985 Agreement was signed. 
What is undisputed is that Elegrante (R. 2014, p. 202), Workman (Depo. p. 33) 
and Richards (R. 2008, p. 932) were not aware of four wheelers in 1985. Frank Gillmor 
did not discuss them with his attorney or attempt to distinguish them from three wheelers 
(R. 2014, p. 204). 
Finding No. 26: Gillmor's discussion of evidence contradicting Finding No. 26 
actually supports the Finding. Richards and his attorney, Ross Workman, testified that if 
they had been aware of four-wheel ATVs, they would have been included in it the 
prohibition. (Workman Depo. p. 33.) Elegante testified Frank Gillmor did not 
intentionally reserve the right to use four-wheel ATVs on the easement. (R. 2014, 
p. 204.) 
22 
Tom Howard's testimony directly supports the trial court's finding. He 
specifically testified, on cross-examination, that they did not distinguish their four-wheel 
ATVs from three-wheel ATVs, and instead referred to them collectively as "three 
wheelers" or as "tracksters." (R. 2012, p. 589.) Tom and Craig Howard's testimony 
provided the most telling evidence of Frank Gillmor's intent. Gillmor told the Howards 
that they had to trailer their ATVs up to his property and that they could not operate them 
on the Perdue Creek road. (R. 2012, pp. 561, 613, 614.) 
In addition, both counsel and Richards testified that the provision was drafted to 
prohibit highly maneuverable, noisy all-terrain vehicles which created dust and could 
easily be driven off the road (Workman Depo. p. 34). Elegante's testimony on this issue 
was unequivocal. He agreed that noise and dust were Richards' primary concerns and 
that this provision was "very important," in fact "fundamental" for Richards. (R. 2014, 
p. 184.) 
This evidence convincingly supports the finding reached by the trial court that the 
only reason four-wheel ATVs were not expressly prohibited was because they were 
relatively new and not consciously distinguished from three-wheel ATVs. 
Finding No. 49: Gillmor's attack on Finding No. 49 primarily claims that the trial 
court erred when it held that the Gillmor family access rights granted in paragraph 3(a) 
did not include the right to allow invitees to use the easement, unless they fit within the 
animal husbandry or maintenance uses. Brief at 19-20. 
In marshalling the evidence supporting the trial court's interpretation, Gillmor 
fails to cite the dispositive language in the Agreement itself. Paragraph 3(c) specifically 
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addresses the use of the easement by invitees. It grants a right of "vehicular access 
(ingress and egress)...for Gillmor's invitees. Such access is hereby limited to access for 
maintenance work performed on the Gillmor property...and for hunting." Tr. Ex. 1. In 
light of this clear language concerning the limited bases on which invitees can use the 
easement, Gillmor's argument fails. 
With respect to Gillmor's claim that the impact of ownership by a corporation or 
other entity on the grant of a personal right of access was never discussed, Gillmor fails 
to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding. Dave Richards testified that 
had Gillmor proposed a grant more general than to Frank and his immediate family, for 
example to the owner of the property and his immediate family, Richards would not have 
accepted that language because it would potentially permit too many users. (R. 2015, 
p. 1086.) This testimony further supports the narrow scope of the personal grant to Frank 
Gillmor. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION, BOTH ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND AT TRIAL, THAT GILLMOR IS PRECLUDED FROM 
USING FOUR-WHEEL ATVS ON THE EASEMENT IS CORRECT. 
The trial court got it right when it ruled that Gillmor may not use four-wheel 
ATVs on the easement. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement provides in part: 
Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use any 
three-wheel motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any two-wheeled 
motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the Easements at any time. 
The trial court found at the conclusion of the trial that: 
Elegante agreed that invitees could use the road only for the purposes permitted 
in the Agreement. (R. 2014, p. 226.) 
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25. At the time the Agreement was signed, ATVs were commonly referred 
to as "three-wheelers." ATVs may have been referred to by some persons 
as "dirt bikes," but there is no persuasive evidence that the term "dirt bikes" 
in the Agreement refers to ATVs. In fact, the evidence suggests, albeit not 
conclusively, that "dirt bikes" were specifically included to prohibit use of 
the noisy and highly maneuverable light motorcycles that Richards found 
annoying in the vicinity of his cabin, and that they were prohibited in 
addition to three-wheel ATVs. 
26. The Court finds that the only reason four-wheel ATVs were not 
expressly prohibited is because they were relatively new and they were 
unknown to the parties, or at a minimum, they were not consciously 
distinguished from "three-wheelers." Both parties, however, intended to 
exclude all terrain vehicles that could, because of their maneuverability and 
other characteristics, too readily depart from the established roads; and 
because, whether on or off the roads, they contributed to the noise and dust 
concerns clearly voiced by Richards. (R. 1716) 
In attacking the trial court's decisions on this issue, Gillmor has failed to marshal 
evidence supportive of the trial court's determinations, either on summary judgment or at 
trial. This Court should affirm the trial court on this basis alone. 
A, Summary Judgment Was Properly Denied. 
Gillmor attacks the trial court's refusal to grant her partial summary judgment on 
the issue of four-wheel ATVs. Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and. . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." Rule 56 (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
As parties against whom summary judgment was sought, Richards, the Maceys 
and Family Link were entitled to have all of the facts presented and all the inferences 
fairly arising therefrom construed in the light most favorable to them. Winegar v. 
Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). Whether contract language is ambiguous 
is a question of law. Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 987 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah 1999). An 
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ambiguity exists where language is reasonably capable of being understood in more than 
one sense. Id., 987 P.2d at 52 (citing R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries, Inc., 936 
P.2d 1068, 1074 (Utah 1997)). Where each party presents tenable conflicting 
interpretations of the disputed language, an agreement is ambiguous for purposes of 
summary judgment, and extrinsic evidence should be considered by the trier of fact. Id., 
987 P.2d at 54. Moreover, the presence of a dispute as to a single material fact precludes 
summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). Even 
where the parties are not in conflict as to certain facts, but the meaning, intention and 
consequences of those facts are vigorously disputed, summary judgment is not proper. 
Sandbergv. Cline, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978). 
In response to Gillmor's motion, the defendants presented considerable evidence 
that the Agreement's reference to all terrain vehicles, motorcycles and dirt bikes was 
ambiguous, creating a genuine issue of fact that only trial could resolve. In particular, the 
Maceys identified more than a dozen references in industry literature to four-wheel ATVs 
as "dirt bikes" or "bikes". (R. 1051-1053) They presented David Richards' deposition 
testimony that he understood the term "dirt bikes" to be a catch-all phrase, intended to 
keep recreational-type vehicles off the easement. Defendants also presented evidence 
that Frank Gillmor had never separately discussed four-wheel ATVs with his counsel, 
James Elegante. They also presented testimony from Richards' counsel in the 1984 
litigation that "our intent was, I believe their agreement and intent at the time was that -
that recreational vehicles of the A.T.V. type, including dirt bikes, was what was 
prescripted by this agreement." (Workman Depo. p. 33-34.) 
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Richards presented the affidavits of Tom Howard and Craig Howard, who Frank 
Gillmor had allowed to use his land for hunting in exchange for maintaining his fences. 
They testified that immediately after the Agreement was signed, Frank Gillmor had 
instructed them not to use their four-wheel ATVs on the easement. (R. 1142.) 
At the summary judgment stage, the trial court was confronted with conflicting 
interpretations of the phrase "dirt bike" created by David Richards' testimony and 
material from industry sources that referred to "dirt bikes" as including all types of 
ATVs, including four-wheel ATVs. The trial judge also had before him unequivocal 
testimony from Richards and his counsel that the intent of the Agreement was to prohibit 
all types of recreational vehicles from using the easement and testimony from Frank 
Gillmor's 1984 counsel, that four-wheel ATVs were not consciously distinguished from 
three-wheel ATVs. (R. 1051.) The trial court was also confronted with the fairly unique 
situation that while the Agreement spoke of three-wheel ATVs, those vehicles had been 
completely replaced by four-wheel ATVs. Each of these circumstances warranted, and in 
fact mandated, that the trial court consider extrinsic evidence in the interpretation of this 
provision. Very simply put, the trial court could not conclude, as a matter of law at 
summary judgment, that four-wheelers were not included in the Agreement. The trial 
court's refusal to grant summary judgment was correct. 
B. The Trial Court's Decision Barring Four-Wheel ATVs Is Correct 
Because of ambiguity in the Agreement created by the factors just discussed, the 
trial court was required to consider extrinsic evidence regarding the parties' intent. 
Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 
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1990). Having properly denied Gillmor's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the 
trial court was entitled and obligated to consider and weigh extrinsic evidence of the 
parties' intent in drafting the provision concerning ATVs. At this level, review of the 
trial court's decision is based on the "clearly erroneous" standard. West Valley City, 818 
P.2datl313. 
Gillmor has failed even to begin to marshal the evidence supporting the trial 
court's conclusions that the provision at issue was ambiguous and that the parties 
intended to prohibit all ATVs. Where the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court may assume that the record supports the trial court's findings. ELM, Inc., 
968 P.2d at 866. 
The following evidence supports the trial court's Findings and Conclusions that 
four-wheel ATVs should be excluded. Every witness at trial who personally participated 
in the 1984 litigation concurred that Richards' principal concern was that the agreement 
include a prohibition against recreational vehicles that generated noise, dust and the 
potential for off road use. (Elegante at R. 2014, p. 184, 204; Workman at Depo. p. 31-34, 
Richards at R. 2008, p. 931.) Four-wheel ATVs present each of these concerns. 
James Elegante testified that he was not aware of four-wheel ATVs in 1985. 
(R. 2014, p. 194, 196.) Frank Gillmor never discussed four-wheelers with him during the 
course of the negotiations (R. 2014, p. 202, 204), and if he and Frank had consciously 
distinguished them from three-wheelers, they would have addressed them. (R. 2014, 
p. 195, 196.) There was no evidence of any intent by Frank to bar only three-wheelers 
and preserve the right to use four-wheelers as Nadine Gillmor suggests. (R. 2014, 
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p. 196.) There was never any testimony to suggest that safety was an issue, as opposed to 
the dust, noise and potential for off road use. What is clear from this evidence is that no 
one, including Frank Gillmor, agreed or intended that four-wheel ATVs could be used on 
the road. 
The trial court also found that four-wheel ATVs were relatively rare in 1984-1985 
but they completely replaced three-wheel ATVs by 1988. (Finding of Fact 23, R. 1715.) 
The trial court also found that Frank Gillmor never owned either three or four-wheel 
ATVs, and that Nadine Gillmor purchased her first four-wheel ATV after Frank's death 
in 1995. (Finding of Fact 24, R. 1715.) This last finding was not challenged by Gillmor. 
Nadine Gillmor argues that Richards could not have intended to exclude four-
wheel ATVs because he was not aware of them. (Brief, p. 34-35). However, Richards, 
Workman and Elegante were all adamant that Richards' concern was with a class of 
vehicles that generated noise, dust and the potential for off road use. Elegante testified 
that Frank Gillmor understood such vehicles "could be a problem" and gave in on this 
issue. (R. 2014, p. 1183-84.) 
With respect to ATVs, David Richards testified specifically that: 
It ["dirt bikes"] conveyed to me that, by putting quotation marks, dirt bike 
refers to motorcycles and refers to three-wheelers, and refers to these all 
terrain type vehicles that would be on the road, and that's why I was putting 
quotation marks, to broaden that term to include all of these things that we 
were talking about. (R. 2008, p. 934.) 
While the judge found that the term "dirt bikes" did not include four-wheelers, he 
properly concluded that the parties intended to prohibit all types of all terrain vehicles. 
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It is also significant here that the manufacture of three-wheeled ATVs was banned 
in the United States in approximately 1988 (Finding of Fact 23), and that they have been 
replaced entirely by four-wheel ATVs, a vehicle that has the same potential for 
generating noise, dust and off road use. See 50 Fed. Reg. 23, 139 (May 31, 1985) 
(Consumer Product Safety Commission's advance notice of proposed rule making for 
ATVs, noting that "until very recently, almost all ATVs were three-wheeled;" the 
Commission's consent decree became effective in 1988); Bitner by Bitner v. American 
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 533 N.W.2d 476, 485 (Wis. 1995) (three and four-wheel ATVs 
"are intended for a similar purpose"). 
A court should interpret a contract's terms in light of the reasonable expectations 
of the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole, and to the circumstances, nature and 
purpose of the contract. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, f 19. This includes viewing the restrictions 
in light of the character of the use meant to be prohibited, even in light of innovations or 
changes in technology. See, e.g., Callahan v. Weland, 279 So.2d 451 (Ala. 1973) (ruling 
that a prohibition against "apartments" was applicable to condominiums as there was no 
difference in the nature of the two buildings and condominiums were not prevalent when 
the restriction was restriction was drafted); Valley Motor, Inc. v. Almberg, 792 P.2d 1131 
(Nev. 1990) (finding that a restriction against "trailers" also applies to "manufactured 
homes" as the purpose of the restriction was to keep the character of the neighborhood 
comprising permanent dwellings); Knadler v. Adams, 661 P.2d 1052 (Wyo. 1983) 
(finding that a restriction of "one residence" includes a restriction against any multiple 
living unit). 
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Gillmor argues that if Richards' intention was to include four-wheel ATVs with 
"dirt bikes" because his intention was unexpressed or subjective, it cannot become a part 
of the contract. Gillmor Brief, p. 37. This argument fails for several reasons. Initially, it 
is clear from the testimony of those who negotiated the Agreement that they intended to 
exclude a class of vehicles and described the class in terms of what existed at the time. In 
other words, Richards' intent was clearly expressed and understood.4 
Gillmor's final argument on the four-wheel ATV issue is that the trial court failed 
to apply the doctrine of practical construction. This doctrine permits a court interpreting 
an agreement and determining the parties' intent to look to the construction placed upon 
it by the parties' conduct and performance since its execution. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972). She recites a number of facts which she claims 
support her assertion. Gillmor Brief at 39. Unfortunately, Gillmor has not cited to the 
record in support of those statements and has, again, failed to marshal the evidence on 
this claim. 
The trial court did focus on the practical construction argument. At the hearing on 
post trial motions on January 8, 2003, the trial court stated: 
. . . let's go to the next thing, the [doctrine] of practical construction. I -
It's a fair question, did I consider it? I did. 
And the reason I rejected it was not - was because I felt that all the 
evidence went to the issue only by one side of the Agreement, one party, 
and again, lacking evidence of awareness and acceptance. And I think that 
4
 Ironically, Gillmor argues that this Court should enforce an unexpressed or 
subjective intent of Frank Gillmor to maintain the right to use four-wheeled ATVs. As 
Gillmor herself points out, such an intent is not binding. 
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made sense on the circumstances. For example, Mr. Macey [sic, Richards] 
ceased using the older cabin, he changed his position, he was not affected 
by Mr. (inaudible) - 1 beg your pardon - he was not affected by these 
things, and I don't think the evidence supports that there was, in fact, a 
course of conduct that would support the application of (inaudible) practical 
construction. So, to answer your question, whether it needs to be an 
additional finding, I don't know, but I considered it in my reasoning and I 
rejected it for the reason it was one-sided to me. (R. 2007, p. 12-13.) 
Compelling evidence supported the trial court's application of the doctrine. Tom 
and Craig Howard testified that Frank told them because of the settlement with Richards, 
they had to trailer their ATVs, which were four-wheeled, over the Perdue Creek road up 
to the Gillmor property. (R. 2012, p. 561; p. 613-614.) Tom Howard stated they were 
told by Frank Gillmor not to: 
unload our ATVs or four-wheelers, or four tracks, that we call 
them, at the bottom and drive them up [Perdue Creek road] 
the way we had been doing, that we had to trailer those 
vehicles to the cabin before we unloaded them. 
(R. 2012, p. 561.) Craig Howard, Tom's brother, also testified that Frank told them they 
had to trailer their ATVs up to the hunting cabin. (R. 2012, p. 613.) The trial court 
appropriately took note of the instructions given by Frank Gillmor to the Howards at the 
time of the Agreement's execution. 
Finally, as discussed previously, the trial court did not find Nadine Gillmor 
credible. This Court can assume that her lack of credibility affected the trial court's 
decision on this issue as well. For example, she testified that Barry Miller, a one-time 
owner of adjacent land formerly a part of the Richards' parcel, saw her using four-
wheelers on the Perdue Creek road all the time. (R. 2011, p. 740-741.) Miller denied 
ever seeing her on a four-wheeler on the road. (Miller Depo., p. 20, 21.) Gillmor finally 
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acknowledged that the one and only time David Richards ever saw her on a four-wheeler 
was after Frank's death. (R. 2011, p. 103.) It is significant that Frank Gillmor owned 
neither a three or four-wheel ATV. (R. 2011, p. 102.) It was only after Frank's death in 
1995 when Nadine Gillmor acquired four-wheelers and her grandchildren moved back to 
Utah and wanted to ride them, that the claim they can be used on the road has been made. 
Thus, contrary to Gillmor's argument here, the trial court did consider the issue of 
practical construction, rejected the evidence advanced by her in support of the argument 
and was obviously persuaded by competing evidence. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RENDER ADVISORY OPINIONS. 
Gillmor's complaint that the trial court somehow issued advisory opinions is in 
error and is simply an expression of her displeasure with the results. While Gillmor's 
brief is far from clear, she appears to complain that the trial court issued "advisory 
opinions" with respect to: (1) the use of the easement by corporate successors; (2) the 
"convoying" of vehicles on the easement; (3) the construction of new structures on the 
Gillmor property; and (4) the number of hunters on the Gillmor property. Gillmor Brief 
p. 44. Gillmor's complaints are unavailing. 
A. Gillmor Failed to Marshall the Evidence. 
In asserting claims of error based on advisory opinions, Gillmor made no effort 
whatsoever to marshal the evidence or provide any specific reference to the record or the 
trial court's Findings or Conclusions. For this reason alone, this Court should reject 
Gillmor's claims that any portion of the judgment is "advisory" in nature. See 
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Aspenwood, LLC v. CAT., LLC, 2003 Utah App. 28, f 44, 73 P.3d 947, 953-54 (Utah 
App. 2003), cert, denied, 72 P.3d 685 (Utah 2003). 
B. The Parties' Requests for a Declaration of Rights Did Not Convert the 
Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions into Advisory Opinions. 
Utah law allows parties to seek a declaration of their rights. U.C.A. § 78-33-1, et 
seq., gives the district courts the power to declare legal relations among interested 
persons. U.C.A. § 78-33-2 states in part that the court may: 
. . . determine any question of construction . . . under the 
instrument. . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations thereunder. 
U.C.A. § 78-33-3 provides that a contract "may be construed either before or after 
there has been a breach thereof." 
All parties sought a declaration of rights under the Agreement, including requests 
to determine who could use the road, whether the road could be used to transport material 
for any purpose not related to animal husbandry, and whether the road could be used to 
transport materials to construct a residence. (R. 797 at 804; R. 820 at 827, ^  10; R. 857 at 
867, ffif 11, 14; R. 868.) They also sought injunctive relief. (R. 868.) In short, these 
matters were appropriately raised under the declaratory judgment statute, and the trial 
court resolved them. 
Moreover, all of the issues raised at trial were ripe for decision. "Ripeness occurs 
when a conflict over the application of a legal provision [has] sharpened into an actual or 
imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the parties thereto." Boyle v. 
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National Union Fire Insurance Co., 866 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis 
added), cert, denied, 236 Utah Adv. 47 (Utah Apr. 5, 1994). 
As a general matter, the trial court's conclusions addressed all uses Gillmor 
claimed were permitted under the Agreement and which she intended to undertake. This 
case is therefore unlike any of the cases Gillmor cites in support of her objection. In 
Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake Cty. Comm 'n., 624 P.2d 1138, 1148 (Utah 1981) the court 
observed that "there [was] no indication offered that any of the plaintiffs are at present in 
violation of any of the provisions of the enacted ordinance, or that they contemplate 
violating such provisions in the near future." (Emphasis added.) See also Jenkins v. 
Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) (discussing standing generally); East Beach 
Properties v. Taylor, 552 S.E.2d 103 (Ga. 2001) (refusing to rule on issues involving 
potential future development on an easement, where there was no specific proposal to 
analyze); Hunker v. Whitacre - Greer Fireproofing, Co., 801 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2003) (allowing declaratory relief as to whether easement was exclusive, but not for 
hypothetical finding if easement was non-exclusive). Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 371 P.2d 
647 (Nev. 1962) is also distinguishable from this case. In Cox the Nevada Supreme 
Court observed that: 
. . . problems arising from the actual use of the way as 
distinguished from the privilege to use it, do not, in most 
cases, depend upon a construction of the conveying 
instrument, but rather upon the consequences resulting from 
such actual use. This being so, factual circumstances which 
may arise in the future cannot be fairly determined now. 
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Cox, 371 P.2d at 655. Unlike Cox, the trial court's ruling in this case focuses upon the 
"privilege to use" the Perdue Creek road and Gillmor's stated positions and intentions 
with respect to such privileges, and is not dependent upon the unknown potential 
consequences of actual use. 
C. The Issue of Consortiums, Corporate Ownership and the Life of the 
Personal Grant to Frank Gillmor Were All Appropriate Issues for 
Resolution. 
The question of the interpretation of the personal grant to Frank Gillmor and his 
family was raised by Gillmor in her deposition and again at trial. (R. 2012, p. 420.) 
Gillmor testified in her deposition that she was in the process of transferring her property 
into a generation-skipping trust for the benefit of her grandchildren and their heirs in 
perpetuity. (R. 2012, p. 422.) In subsequent testimony, Gillmor testified that a right of 
unfettered access for any purpose was not limited to her and her family. (R. 2012, 
p. 426.) During the same line of questioning, Gillmor's counsel represented to the Court 
that: 
The role of the Court in this litigation is to interpret the 
agreement as it is written, interpret what the acceptable uses 
are under the Easement Agreement, and then, if particular 
evidence or situations arise of undue burden on the servient 
estate under those uses which cannot be litigated here in the 
abstract, we could get to them." (R. 2012, p. 429,1. 20 - 430, 
1.1.) 
The trial court concluded that: 
It was clearly not the intention of the parties that this grant [in 
Section 3(a)] should open the easements to heavy use in the 
event of corporate ownership, or even purchase by a 
consortium of owners. In the event the record owner(s) are 
ever other than an identifiable immediate family (for 
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example, siblings, and their families to the first degree of 
consanguinity are legitimate successors to the easement 
grant), then this provision will fail. 
(R. 1711 at 1721.) This language is mirrored in the Judgment (R. 1785). 
This conclusion and the Judgment are in direct response to Gillmor's testimony at 
trial about her intentions to end run the narrowly crafted personal grant in paragraph 3(a) 
and her professed belief that she can avoid it limitations.5 
D. The Dispute Over Convoys of Vehicles Was Ripe for Decision, 
Gillmor's assertion - without marshalling evidence or citing to the record - that 
the issue of vehicle convoys was not properly before the trial court is in error. At trial, 
the undisputed evidence proved the parties negotiated in the Agreement to preclude 
excessive use of the road during the hunting season by vehicles going to the Gillmor 
property. (R. 2015, p. 1156, 57.) Gillmor made an explicit claim in her post-trial 
motions that she could avoid the six vehicle limitation in paragraph 6 by "shuttling " 
people to the property. 
Furthermore, although Gillmor acknowledges that she can 
have no more than 18 licensed hunters on her property by the 
Perdue Creek road at any one time, there is no limit 
concerning the number of non-hunters who can accompany 
the hunters. Thus, for example, while there can only be 18 
licensed hunters, those hunters are entitled to take spouses or 
children with them . . . , even if that requires a shuttling of 
people to the property. 
(R. 1812, p. 18-19.) These claims made the issue of convoying vehicles ripe for decision. 
5
 Although the issue of the future of the personal right of access after the three 
generations addressed in the Agreement was clearly raised by Nadine Gillmor's claims, a 
correct interpretation of the personal right of access avoids the problems addressed by the 
Conclusion of Law. See Section I, p. 47 below. 
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E. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with Respect to Cabin 
Construction Was Not an Advisory Opinion. 
Gillmor's assertion that the trial court could not address use of the road for 
construction is without basis. Gillmor herself raised the issue of whether the Perdue 
Creek road could be used for construction access for additional cabins. (See R. 2012, 
p. 449 . 451.) in Finding 18 (R. 1714), the trial judge found that: 
. . . Richards absolutely did not intend that Gillmor could use 
the servient property to aid construction (of additional 
structures) in any way. The parties did not intend, and the 
agreement does not provide for Gillmor to use the servient 
estate for construction access in any form, such as 
transportation of building materials or construction workers." 
The Conclusions of Law at R. 1721 contain the statement that: 
This easement may not be used to engage in new construction 
on the Gillmor property, in the guise of maintenance. Access 
for any work on the Gillmor property that does not fit clearly 
within the definition of access route maintenance must 
qualify as "animal husbandry. 
This language is mirrored in the Judgment under Section 3 at R. 1784. Gillmor's explicit 
claims required the trial court to determine whether the easement could be used for new 
construction, and having done so, it was appropriate for the court to couch its decision in 
general terms rather than limiting the interpretation to Gillmor's current plans. 
F. The Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions with Respect to the 
Number of Hunters Was Not Advisory, 
Without marshalling evidence or referencing any specific Findings or 
Conclusions, Gillmor asserts that the trial court's findings set presumptive limits on the 
number of hunters on the Gillmor property. Nowhere in the Findings, Conclusions or 
Judgment, does the Court set "presumptive" limits for numbers of hunters on the Gillmor 
38 
property. The only issue the Court addressed is how many hunters can be on the Gillmor 
property having used the easement as access. Because there are other means of access to 
the Gillmor property (R. 2011; p. 726-729), there could be hundreds of people on the 
Gillmor property, but under the terms of the Agreement only 18 of them can be on the 
property having traveled over the Perdue Creek road. 
For all of these reasons, Gillmor's claims that the trial court rendered "advisory 
opinions" is incorrect. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DENIED GILLMOR'S MOTION TO AMEND, 
Gillmor's asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her 
motion to amend her complaint to add a new claim seeking to rescind the agreement 
between Richards and her late husband. Gillmor sought to add the claim on the basis 
that, because Frank never would have entered into the agreement that did not preserve all 
of his claimed prescriptive rights, there was no meeting of the minds. (R. 424 at 432, 
Count IV.) Put another way, sixteen years after the fact, Nadine Gillmor sought to undo 
a written, on the record settlement, to which she was not a party, on the basis that there 
was no meeting of the minds between her husband and Richards. 
The trial court's ruling denying that portion of her motion to amend is governed by 
the abuse of discretion standard. Trethway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App. 400, f^ 7, 40 
P.3d 649, 653 (Utah App. 2001). An amendment is not permitted under all 
circumstances, and a trial court may appropriately deny such a motion if it would be 
unfairly prejudicial, futile, or would constitute an attempt to assert theories opposite to 
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those asserted earlier in the litigation. Andalex Resources, Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 
1046 (Utah App. 1994). 
In seeking reversal of the trial court's decision, Gillmor has failed to address all 
the reasons the trial court denied her motion in the first place. For example, the trial 
court considered the pleadings and the parties' oral arguments, and ruled: 
The Court. . . finds that the claims that plaintiff proposes to 
add by the Amended Complaint are barred by, among other 
things, Rule 60 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, principles 
of res judicata; equitable bars, including laches, principles 
regarding the sanctity of agreements, and for the other 
reasons set forth in the pleadings of defendants, the plaintiffs 
claims fail as a matter of law... 
On these bases, the trial court denied the motion to amend, 
as to any attempt to set aside the 1985 Order entered by the 
District Court, the 1985 Agreement between Charles Frank 
Gillmor and David K. Richards & Co., or any attempt to 
claim a prescriptive easement based on events occurring prior 
to 1984. 
(R 776.) Gillmor's Motion to amend her other claims was granted and her second 
amended complaint was filed on December 3, 2001. (R. 797.) 
The trial court's ruling adopted the defendants' arguments opposing Gillmor's 
motion to amend: it was futile, as a legal matter; it was highly and unfairly prejudicial; 
and it reflected an attempt to change horses midstream. 
Gillmor's proposed amendment was futile for several reasons. First, the trial court 
was persuaded to deny the amendment as futile because it was time barred by Rule 60 
(b)(1), which provides a three month deadline for opening up a judgment on the basis of 
mistake. As this Court once explained, there "is an institutional hesitancy to relieve a 
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party from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice of counsel." Richins 
v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Birch 
v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah App. 1989)). Gillmor's argument that her claim was 
brought "timely" under Rule 15 fails to take account that her motion was held untimely 
because it was sixteen years too late under Rule 60, not because it was made several 
months before trial. The trial court's ruling on this basis was not an abuse of discretion. 
Likewise, Gillmor's claim to rescind was barred by res judicata, which prohibits 
re-litigation of a matter when (1) both actions involve the same parties, or their privies or 
assigns; (2) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the claim 
asserted in the earlier litigation is asserted later. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988). Res judicata applies because Nadine Gillmor admitted she was Frank's 
assignee; the prior lawsuit was resolved on its merits in an Order and Judgment; and the 
claim Nadine wanted to assert, Frank's prescriptive easement, was the same claim Frank 
brought in the earlier lawsuit. 
Gillmor's proposed amendment was also futile because it sought to overturn the 
settlement agreement between Frank Gillmor and Richards. The trial court was 
appropriately reluctant to set aside a settlement agreement. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 
P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (holding that "settlement agreements are favored in the law 
and should be encouraged because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the 
parties, but also to the judicial system."). This reluctance exists even where a party seeks 
to rescind on the basis of mistake. See Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 
688, 692 (Utah 1985) (refusing to rescind settlement on mistake theory where both 
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parties were not mistaken as to subject matter of settlement). Considering the undisputed 
facts that the Agreement, as well as the stipulation and order of dismissal, and order and 
judgment, were drafted by Frank Gillmor's attorney, that portions of the Agreement were 
read into the record in 1985, and that the parties executed the agreement in open court, 
the trial court correctly ruled that the amendment was futile. (R 776.) 
Other important arguments were persuasive to the trial court. Nadine Gillmor 
lacked standing to overturn the settlement agreement and judgment. Overturfv. 
University of Utah Med. Ctr, 973 P.2d 413 (Utah 1999) (holding that a person not a party 
of record to the original lawsuit lacks standing to set aside settlement agreement). 
Moreover, Gillmor could not show that her claim to rescind the Agreement would allow 
the parties to restore the status quo ante, a required showing for rescission. See 
Monstrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 579-80 (Utah App. 1993) (party must show it is 
possible to restore status quo when seeking rescission) cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 
1994). Finally, the trial court correctly ruled that Gillmor's claimed amendment was 
barred by laches, which applies to equitable claims like rescission, and bars recovery 
when there has been a delay by one party that causes disadvantage to the other. Plateau 
Min. Co., 802 P.2d at 731. Courts are reluctant to set aside compromise agreements and 
judgments made late in the game. In re Estate ofChasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986); 
Richins,SU?.2d382. 
Gillmor's motion to amend also unfairly prejudiced the defendants because there 
was no way they could cross-examine Frank Gillmor, who was supposedly the party 
"mistaken" about the Agreement. Bekins Bar VRanch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 
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1983) (courts should not allow an amendment that would cause unfair prejudice). 
Finally, Gillmor's attempt to rescind the Agreement was directly contrary to her attempt, 
earlier in this litigation, to enforce the Agreement by means of a motion for preliminary 
injunction. (R 21.) Leave to amend is denied when parties attempt to change horses 
midstream. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984). 
Gillmor's claim that the savings clause of Rule 60(b) allows her to assert a claim 
of mistake to rescind her husband's agreement is without basis. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
interpreting the savings clause in Federal Rule 60 (b), which is identical to Utah's rule, 
explained the clause is "reserved for those cases of injustices where, in certain instances, 
are deemed sufficiently gross to demand a departure from rigid adherence to the doctrine 
of res judicata." United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 46 (1998); see also St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982) (stating that the clause allows a court to review 
"an unconscionable judgment or order" through an independent action). Gillmor did not 
raise before the trial court any exceptional circumstances or allegations that the prior 
judgment was unconscionable. Even if she had, the trial court's finding that she was 
barred by the doctrine of laches was sufficient to preclude any such independent action. 
See Simons v. United States, 452 F.2d 1110, 1117-18 (2nd Cir. 1971) (independent action 
to set aside decree barred by laches due to delay and death of key witness). Where Frank 
Gillmor had operated under the agreement for more than a decade until his death without 
any allegation of mistake, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gillmor's 
attempt to set aside the Agreement on the basis of Rule 60(b)'s savings clause. In any 
event, even if the trial court was wrong in failing to allow the amendment its error would 
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have been harmless. Rule 61, U.R.C.P. Nadine Gillmor's claim was, in essence, that 
Frank never agreed to give up any of his historical rights regarding use of the road. 
Frank's own attorney, James Elegante, the only living person who was actively involved 
in the negotiation on behalf of Frank, readily acknowledges that Frank made concessions 
to obtain the Agreement (R. 2014, p. 194-195.) The trial court stated during post trial 
motions that the Agreement represented a compromise by Gillmor. (R. 2007, p. 20.) The 
trial court correctly denied Gillmor's attempt to bring a claim to rescind the Agreement. 
Although Gillmor's motion was made under Rule 15 (R. 424), she argues that her 
efforts to set aside the Agreement are based upon equitable principles applicable to Rule 
60 alluded to In the Matter of Baby Boyd Doe, 894 P.2d 1285, 1288 (Utah App. 1995). 
However, Gillmore ignores the legal principles in Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah 
App. 1992), referred to in Baby Boyd Doe. As discussed in Maertz, laches is one of the 
factors mitigating against granting a motion like Gillmor's. Id. at 261. Here, one of the 
parties to the Agreement, Frank Gillmor, was deceased. Defendants would have had no 
opportunity to examine him regarding the Agreement. Laches was one of the bases 
specifically cited by the trial court in its ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling that the Agreement Permits Plaintiff, Her 
Children and Grandchildren to Use the Easement for Personal Use? 
A. Did the trial court err in ruling that a grant of personal access to 
"[Frank] Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of 
consanguinity, and their spouses and children" included Nadine 
Gillmor, her children and grandchildren? 
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B. Did the trial court err in ruling that the provision in the Agreement 
that the easements and limitations run with the land permits successors 
to Frank Gillmor, including generations later than his grandchildren, 
to enjoy the personal right of access granted to Frank Gillmor and his 
immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity? 
C. Did the trial court err in determining that Section 3(a) of the Easement 
Agreement is ambiguous if the successor owner is not a single 
individual? 
The standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of a contract, and the initial 
question of whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313. If the contract is unambiguous, the 
interpretation of the contract is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness. If the 
contract is ambiguous, and the trial court admits extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties' 
intent, the trial court's construction is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. 
The issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 1575 and R. 2015, 
p. 1287. 
2. Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling that There Can Only be 18 Hunters, 
Rather than 18 Persons on the Gillmor Property Who Access That Property 
By Way of the Easements? 
The trial court's ruling using the term "hunters" as opposed to "persons" is an 
erroneous Conclusion of Law and is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City, 818 
P.2datl313. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 2007, p. 36, 37. 
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3. Did the Trial Court Err in Ruling That the Occupant of the Hunting Cabin 
on the Gillmor Property has General Rights of Access for Any Purpose 
Which is Consistent With Historical Use, and Such Historical Use Includes 
"General Recreation"? 
The standard of review of a trial court's interpretation of a contract, and the initial 
question of whether a contract is ambiguous, is a question of law and is reviewed for 
correctness. If a contract is unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract is a question 
of law and reviewed for correctness. If a contract is ambiguous, and the trial court admits 
extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties' intent, the trial court's construction is reviewed 
under the clearly erroneous standard. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1313. 
This issue was preserved for appeal at, among others, R. 1792 at 1794. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
The trial court did error, as a matter of law, by failing to limit Nadine Gillmor's 
(and her childrens') personal use of the easement. The personal use of the easement was, 
by the language of the Agreement, limited to Frank Gillmor, and his relations to the first 
degree of consanguinity. The trial court errored in determining that the "occupants" of 
the line shack have a general right of access, as opposed to access for hunting and animal 
husbandry. There was no evidence that the occupants of the relocated line shack had ever 
used the Perdue Creek road for "general access." Finally, the trial court errored when it 
misused the term "hunters" in place of "persons" in stating its ruling on the number of 
persons who can use the easement for access to the Gillmor property for hunting. 
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ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD NADINE GILLMOR AND 
HER CHILDREN HAVE A PERSONAL RIGHT OF ACCESS, 
The trial court ruled that the right of personal access granted to Frank Gillmor and 
two generations of his descendants extends to Nadine Gillmor, his wife, and her children 
by a prior marriage. (R. 1721.) This ruling is in error. 
A. Marshalling of Evidence. 
The Agreement expressly grants a right of personal access to Frank Gillmor and 
two generations of his blood descendants: 
(a) Vehicular access (ingress and egress) between [the highway and the 
Gillmor property]. Such access is hereby limited to access for maintenance 
work performed on the Gillmor property . . ., "for access by [Frank] 
Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree of consanguinity
 f and 
their spouses and children', to the Gillmor property, and for animal 
husbandry; 
(Tr. Ex. 1 at paragraph 3(a).) 
Paragraph 4 of the Agreement provides: 
4. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive nature of the 
Easements herein granted and the limitations on use herein contained are 
declared by the parties hereto to be covenants and restrictions which run 
with and are appurtenant to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, 
herein described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of 
all present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and lessees of 
said Properties. 
When asked about the phrase "and their spouses and children," Frank Gillmor's 
attorney who drafted the Agreement, James Elegante, testified: 
Well, at the time Frank was married to Nadine Gillmor, his second wife. 
His first - his oldest daughter had divorced, but I know that Frank felt that 
the time would come when she would either go back to her first husband or 
she would remarry. And his second daughter had yet to marry, and I think 
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that Frank had felt that he had always taken his family up there and that his 
children ought to be able to do the same. (R. 2014, p. 170.) 
Elegante was also asked whether there was any discussion with Frank Gillmor 
about Frank and his family's right of access passing to a subsequent owner because the 
covenants would run with the land. Elegante responded "absolutely" and went on to say: 
I'll tell you what. I mean, I don't think there's any question about that 
because Frank, you know, Frank could have done a lot of things with this 
land. Jamie was leasing the land, Jamie Gillmor, was working it with his 
dad Steve. Steve actually had the lease at the time, but Jamie was the, you 
know, out doing the work. They had asked Frank. I [know] for a fact they 
had asked Frank to buy the land. There were lots of things that Frank could 
have done, and I don't think there was any question because Steve Gillmor 
was involved in this, and Steve Gillmor certainly wasn't going to give up 
his right to get up there. If he would have bought this land from Frank, he 
would have needed them. (R. 2014, p. 218.) 
The trial court concluded "... that with the death of Frank Gillmor, and based on 
the unambiguous language of Section 4 ("Covenants to Run with the Land"), and the 
intention of the parties as determined by the court, this grant inures to the benefit of 
Frank's present successor, Nadine Gillmor, her spouse, if any in the future, along with 
her children, their spouses and children. (R. 1781, at 1785)." 
B. The Unambiguous Language of Paragraph 3(a) Does Not Include 
Nadine Gillmor, Her Children or Grandchildren. 
The trial court erred when it ruled that the unambiguous personal grant of access 
to Frank Gillmor inures to Nadine Gillmor, who was not related to him by consanguinity. 
The only grant of a right of access, other than for the enumerated purposes of hunting, 
maintenance work performed on the Gillmor property, maintenance on the road and 
animal husbandry, permits: "access by [Frank] Gillmor and his immediate family to the 
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first degree of sanguinity, and their spouses and children,. . ." (Tr. Ex. 1, paragraph 3(a)). 
During the course of the trial, the trial court observed that this provision was not 
ambiguous. (R. 2014, p. 171.) 
The trial court based its decision that Nadine Gillmor now has a personal right of 
access in part on its finding that, given Frank Gillmor's age and health problems, he must 
have been cognizant of his own mortality and a finding that Frank had an intention to 
preserve immediate family access to the property, "to which he had substantial personal 
commitment. " (R. 1718, para. 48.) 
The trial court's conclusion fails to take into account that rights-of-way must be 
limited to the uses set forth in the Agreement: 
A right-of-way founded upon a deed or grant is limited to the uses, and the 
extent thereof as fixed by the grantor deed. . . a right-of-way for one 
purpose gained by user cannot be turned into a right-of-way for another 
purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden of the servient estate; and 
the right derived from user can never outrun or exceed the uses in which it 
had its origin. . . the right cannot be enlarged to place a greater burden on or 
servitude on the property. 
Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943) (quoting American Bank-Note Co. v. 
New York El R. Co., 129 N.Y. 252 (1891)); see also Labrum, 711 P.2d at 227; Kikta, 766 
P.2d at 323 ("Owner of the dominant estate cannot change the extent of the easement or 
subject the servient estate to an additional burden not contemplated by the grant of 
easement"); Steil, 901 P.2d at 396 ("Where an easement is claimed under a grant, the 
extent of the right depends on its terms"). Likewise, unambiguous contractual provisions 
are enforceable. See R&R Energies, 936 P.2d at 1077-78. 
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"Consanguinity" is a relationship by blood, and "affinity" is a relationship by 
marriage. See State v. Peterson, 174 P. 2d 843, 847 (Utah 1946). Elegante, who drafted 
the language at issue, understood consanguinity does not mean affinity. (R. 2014, 
p. 224.) Neither Nadine Gillmor nor her children are related to Frank Gillmor by 
consanguinity. (R. 2014, p. 73-74.) Nadine's only relationship to Frank was by affinity. 
Nadine's children are not related to Frank at all. As a simple matter of contract 
interpretation, neither Nadine nor her children are entitled to the personal grant to Frank 
Gillmor in paragraph 3(a). On this basis alone, the trial court's ruling is in error. 
The evidence made clear that the parties to the Agreement never intended the 
personal grant to Frank Gillmor to extend to anyone besides Frank, his daughters and 
their children. David Richards, the only living party to the Agreement, understood the 
consanguinity language to include Frank, his two daughters and their three children, and, 
on this basis, the language was satisfactory to him. (R. 2008, p. 944-45.) If this language 
had instead made reference to the owner of the property and the owner's immediate 
family to the first degree of consanguinity, Richards would not have agreed because he 
could not have known how many people might be allowed to use the road. (R. 2015, 
p. 1086.) The provision's clear reference to Frank allowed Richards to know who had 
the personal grant. This is consistent with Elegante's recollection that Frank was 
concerned about his daughters and his personal use of the property with them. (R. 2014, 
p. 167-168.) Elegante acknowledged there were no discussions of this language. 
(R. 2014, p. 220.) 
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C The Provision That the Easements and Limitations Run With the Land 
Does Not Expand Frank Gillmor's Personal Right. 
The trial court's second reason for concluding that Nadine Gillmor, her children 
and her grandchildren were entitled to Frank Gillmor's personal right of access was the 
Agreement's reference to the covenants running with the land: 
Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive nature of the Easements 
herein granted and the limitations on use herein contained are declared by 
the parties hereto to be covenants and restrictions which run with and are 
appurtenant to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of all 
present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and lessees of said 
Properties. 
(Tr. Ex. 1,1| 4.) 
The Agreement's reference to "running with the land" does not convert the 
unambiguous specific personal grant to Frank Gillmor into a personal right of access to 
Nadine Gillmor. Frank Gillmor included the provision, according to his attorney, 
because Frank had been in a lot of litigation and his desire was not to "have to go through 
this again." (R. 2014, p. 187.) Thus, the impetus for paragraph 4 was Frank's desire not 
to have to litigate with a future owner of Richards' property.6 
Paragraph 3(a) granting a personal right of access to Frank Gillmor was not added 
to the Agreement until the November 20 draft, (Tr. Ex. 310), the day before the 
Agreement was signed. There was no evidence that Frank Gillmor and Richards 
discussed, let alone negotiated for, the personal grant to Frank to run from owner to 
6
 This is consistent with Nadine Gillmor's testimony that Frank never considered 
selling his property. (R. 2012, p. 540-541.) 
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owner. Although Elegante responded affirmatively when asked if he and Frank discussed 
the interplay of the two provisions, the rest of his answer did not refer to anything he said 
to Frank or Frank said to him.7 (R. 2014, p. 218.) 
That the personal grant was not meant to apply to future owners other than Frank 
Gillmor was confirmed by the evidence at trial. Elegante testified to Frank's sentimental 
attachment to this property and his fond recollections of taking his daughters there when 
they were small. (R. 2014, p. 168.) When asked about the intent of the phrase, "their 
spouses and children," Elegante testified, (R. 2014, p. 170): 
Well, at the time Frank was married to Nadine Gillmor, his second wife. 
His first - his oldest daughter had divorced, but I know that Frank felt that 
the time would come when she would either go back to her first husband or 
she would remarry. And his second daughter had yet to marry , and I think 
that Frank had felt that he had always taken his family up there and that his 
children ought to be able to do the same. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from Elegante's testimony that Frank's view of his property was both 
practical and sentimental. On the practical side, he wanted to be sure he had the rights of 
access necessary to continue to use the property for summer pasture. At the same time, 
he wanted his children and their children to be able to enjoy the beauty of the land. 
Because this desire grew out of his history and his family's history with the land, the 
Instead Elegante testified that Frank could have sold the property to his cousin 
Steve, who was leasing it to run sheep and cattle, and Steve, who was not a party to the 
Agreement, would have wanted the rights. Furthermore, although paragraph 4 says the 
easements benefit all "present and future owners and/or purchasers, occupants and 
lessees" of the properties, there was no suggestion at trial that Steve, as a current lessee, 
had a personal right of access for himself and his family to the first degree of 
consanguinity and their spouses and children. And Elegante's answer did not suggest any 
discussion with Richards about the right of future owners to have this personal access. 
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right of personal access was one which quite reasonably he negotiated for himself and 
without concern for future owners or even current lessees. It must also be considered in 
light of the fact that there were other accesses to Frank's property. 
Even if this Court were to conclude that the right granted to Frank in paragraph 
3(a) ran with the land because of the covenant language in pargraph 4, this Court should 
not expand the language agreed upon in the Agreement and extend the right to anyone 
other than those specified in the grant. Nadine Gillmor argued that Frank's personal right 
of use should pass from owner to owner. It is clear that this was not intended. The only 
permissible interpretation of the Agreement if Frank Gillmor transferred his interest is 
that Frank (and the specified family members) could continue to use the easement 
(provided they negotiated with the new owners for access to the property). Any other 
application of the covenant would give Frank Gillmor something he could not have 
gotten and did not obtain by Agreement. 
In Metropolitan Investment Co. v. Sine, 376 P.2d 940 (Utah 1962), the Supreme 
Court refused to stray from express language in a restrictive covenant simply because the 
title to the subject property switched hands. The Court considered a restriction placed in 
a deed that prohibited the grantee, Nielson, from constructing a hotel on property he 
purchased in Salt Lake. The grantor in the deed had two motel operations located on 
adjacent parcels and did not want a competing hotel constructed on the property he was 
selling to Nielson. The question at trial and on appeal was whether the restrictive 
covenant, which precluded the construction of a competing hotel, could be undone by a 
new owner of the property. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conclusion on 
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this issue observing that to do otherwise would permit the purpose of the covenant to be 
frustrated simply by the owner transferring title. 
Like the new owner in Metropolitan, Gillmor seeks to read out of the Agreement 
its clear and unambiguous personal grant to Frank Gillmor, and thereby frustrate the 
intent of the original parties to the Agreement. This is not the bargain Richards 
negotiated, and the trial court's attempt to give future owners the benefit of rights that 
were personal to Frank Gillmor is in error. 
D. The Trial Court's Interpretation Creates Ambiguities. 
Not only did the trial court stray from the unambiguous language of the present 
grant to Frank Gillmor, its decision also unnecessarily created new ambiguities. The trial 
court acknowledged these problems. For example, the trial court amended the Judgment 
to state that the language regarding Frank "is ambiguous as to its meaning if the 
successor owner is not a single individual or couple, such as Frank and Nadine Gillmor, 
or Nadine Gillmor individually, at this time. It was clearly not the intention of the parties 
that this grant should open the easements to heavy use in the event of corporate 
ownership, or even purchase by a consortium of owners." (Judgment, R. 1781, p 5.) The 
trial court's solution to the ambiguity it created was to hold that if the record owner(s) are 
ever other than an identifiable immediate family (including siblings and their families to 
the first degree of consanguinity) the provision fails. (Ibid.) In other words, the trial 
court treated the words "Frank Gillmor" in paragraph 3(a) as a blank space, into which 
any family, but never a corporation, could insert its name. 
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The trial court's reasoning and attempt to limit the consequence of its conclusion 
on consanguinity is plain error. Its conclusions defeat the limited purpose of this very 
personal grant and the intentions of the parties. The trial court's struggle with this 
provision can best be resolved by a determination that the personal right granted to Frank 
and to two generations of his blood relatives was just that, and nothing more.8 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
"OCCUPANTS OF THE CABIN" HAVE A RIGHT OF ACCESS FOR ANY 
HISTORICAL USE, INCLUDING GENERAL RECREATION. 
Paragraph 2 of the Agreement identifying the recipients of the easements states 
". . . it is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the Gillmor property, and 
that the occupant of such cabin shall have the right to use the Easements for access to 
such cabin." In its Judgment, R. 1781 at 1783, the trial court held that: 
The "occupant of such cabin" has general rights of access across the 
servient estate to access the cabin for any purpose which is consistent with 
historical use. Historical uses include animal husbandry (specifically 
including fence maintenance), general recreation (e.g. picnics, camping) 
and hunting. 
This ruling is in error. 
A, The Trial Court's Grant of Access for Any Purpose Consistent With 
Historical Use is Contrary to the Express Terms of the Agreement 
The trial court's grant of a right of access for general recreation, such as picnics 
and camping, to the occupants of the hunting cabin is contrary to express terms of the 
This interpretation also precludes Gillmor's attempt to circumvent the three-
generation limit in the personal grant by putting the property in a trust for her 
descendants after her grandchildren. (R. 2012, p. 422.) 
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Agreement and is erroneous. As discussed above in Section I, paragraph 3 of the 
Agreement limits the purposes for which the easements may be used: 
The easements herein granted are granted for the following purposes only 
and shall not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards. 
Paragraph 3 allows for access along the Perdue Creek road for animal husbandry, 
for Frank Gillmor personally, and for maintenance and for hunting. No other uses of 
Perdue Creek road are permitted. The limitations on use in paragraph 3 apply to every 
easement granted in the Agreement, including the rights of the "occupant of the cabin." 
Moreover, Elegante's initial draft of the provision that became paragraph 6 of the 
Agreement provided for use by invitees "for recreational purposes." That language was 
rejected by Richards. (Tr. Ex. 332, para. 8.) The language was changed to permit use by 
invitees for hunting purposes in the final Agreement. (Tr. Ex. 1 para. 6.) The trial 
court's extension to the "occupant of the cabin" of new rights violates the express terms 
of the Agreement and requires reversal. 
B. The Historical Use of the Cabin Did Not Include General Recreation. 
Even if the Agreement were held to be ambiguous as to whether the "occupant of 
the cabin" is limited to the uses for invitees set forth in the Agreement, the evidence 
showed the "occupants" of the cabin did not historically use the access for general 
recreation. 
1. Marshalling the Evidence. 
At the time the Agreement was negotiated, Vern Howard and his sons were 
considered the "occupant" of the cabin. (R. 2011, p. 878-79.) Vern Howard testified (by 
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deposition taken in the 1984 litigation) that his visits to the property were for 
maintenance work, and that any recreating was connected to work: 
Q. I think you have already described the type of work that you do up there, 




Q. Do you ever go up there camping when you don't do work on Frank Gillmor's 
property? 
A. We may have on occasion gone without working but it's— 
Q. It's generally in connection with the work that you do up there; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The picnicking that you do up there, would that also be generally in connection 
with the work that you do? 
A. Well, generally the family goes along and prepares the picnic for the family, and 
the rest of us do the work and then you come back and eat. 
Q. I see. 
A. Of if you camp overnight, you - they are there, you know, and we all camp over 
together. 
(Pltf. Tr. Ex. 19, V. Howard deposition, p. 49-50.) 9 
9
 Vern Howard's deposition contains additional references to the fact that 
picnicking and camping were associated with work on the property and not independent 
recreation. (See Tr. Ex. 19, p. 10-11; p. 15; p. 29; p. 33; p. 36; and p. 37-38.) Many of 
these references to picnicking and camping, however, were to the period of time before 
the current cabin was built in approximately 1981, when the Howards were accessing an 
old line shack in a different location that was reached by the White's Basin road, and not 
the Perdue Creek road that is at issue in this case. 
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Vern Howard's statement that he and his family "may" have gone to the property 
on occasion without working is the only evidence of "general recreation" unconnected 
with work or hunting. 
2. The Court's Factual Finding Is Clearly Erroneous, 
Vern Howard's sons, Tom and Craig, also were asked about their use of the cabin. 
Tom Howard testified that their visits were principally for working and hunting: 
Q. But you also picnic up at the line shack up the Perdue Creek, correct? 
A. Mostly that was all work duty up there. It was fencing, it was building the cabin, 
and mostly that's all it was. 
Q. So was there any reason that you didn't picnic up there and camp like you used to 
[referring to his earlier testimony about White's Creek which involved a different 
access road]? 
A. I think mainly just because it came more of a work-oriented detail. We were doing 
it as a means to have our deer hunting spot. 
(R. 2012, p. 579.) 
Tom Howard likewise denied that people who went to work and hunt with them 
used the Perdue Creek road to picnic or camp on the Gillmor property other than to hunt: 
Q. Jim Manzanares went up the Perdue Creek road? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he went up there to picnic, didn't he, and camp? 
A. He was up there to hunt with us. 
(R. 2012, p. 580-581.) 
Craig Howard explained that they used the road to work and hunt on the property: 
Q. Did Mr. Gillmor tell you that, in exchange for the work you were doing for him up 
there, that your family could recreate on that property? 
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A. He let us hunt, was the agreement. 
Q. Okay, did you ever do anything other than hunt? 
A. We fenced and we hunted. 
Q. I am talking about recreation. Did you ever do any recreation other than hunt on 
that property? 
A. Well, I did swap (sic) [scope] for animals up there. 
Q. Did you ever have picnics up there with your family? 
A. Occasionally, when we were building the hunting cabin, I recall some 
picnicking. 
(R. 2012, p. 619.) (emphasis added). 
As the testimony of the Howards demonstrates, even if there were some basis for 
the trial court to interpret the Agreement to give occupants of the cabin access for any 
purpose consistent with historical use, that use did not include general recreation.10 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 18 HUNTERS, AS 
OPPOSED TO 18 PERSONS, CAN ACCESS THE GILLMOR PROPERTY 
BY THE EASEMENTS. 
The trial court's ruling that "18 hunters" may use the easement under paragraph 6 
of the Agreement is an erroneous interpretation of the Agreement. This error is important 
because Gillmor has flouted the provision's express limitation of "18 persons," by 
allowing invitees to nominate themselves as either "hunters" or "non-hunters" so that 
more than 18 people can use the easement. Thus, during any given hunting season, there 
10
 Lou Stevens, one of the individuals who took over putting up and taking down 
fences after Frank Gillmor terminated his arrangement with the Howard group, did testify 
that he was told by Frank Gillmor that he could access the property for any reason he 
wanted at any time he wanted. (R. 2011, p. 695.) However, Stevens was not putting up 
and taking down the fences before the Agreement was signed, so his use was not 
historical use in any event. 
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are far more than 18 people and six vehicles using the Perdue Creek road for access. 
(R. 2015, p. 1156.) This expanded use contravenes an essential element of the 
Agreement, i.e., protecting the peace and quiet of the owners of the servient estate. 
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement (Tr. Ex. 1), provides that: 
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 18 persons 
and six vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at 
any time. 
The Judgment states that (R. 1787): 
The Agreement does not purport to limit the number of 
hunters on the Gillmor property, but there can be only 
eighteen hunters on the Gillmor property who accessed that 
property by way of the easements, and those hunters may not 
use more than six vehicles. 
During argument on January 8, 2003, counsel for Richards brought this distinction 
to the trial court's attention in the following exchange: 
Counsel: . . . Well, if Ms. Gillmor will go back and 
look at the Agreement, paragraph six says, 
Gillmor agrees he shall not allow more than 
18 persons and six vehicles to use the 
easement for hunting purposes. Not 18 
hunters, 18 persons. 
Court: Yeah. 
Ms. Dunning: So — 
Court: There is simply no grant of easement to all 
these others. 
(R. 2007, p. 35-36.) 
The discrepancy was not corrected by the trial court. There is no evidence in the 
record that would warrant changing the language of the Agreement, and it was probably a 
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simple oversight by the trial court. The use of the word "persons" in the Agreement is 
not ambiguous. The trial court did not indicate it was ambiguous. Its use of the word 
"hunters" in place of "persons" is clearly erroneous, and should be corrected on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should: 
1. Determine that the personal right of use granted in the Agreement to Frank 
Gillmor and his family does not extend to Nadine Gillmor and her family or 
any future owner of the Gillmor property, and reverse the trial court's 
contrary conclusion of law at R. 1721. 
2. Determine that the "occupants of the cabin" do not have a general right of 
access along the Perdue Creek road and limit their uses to those specified in 
the Agreement, i.e., animal husbandry, maintenance and hunting; 
3. Determine that the Perdue Creek road may not be used by Gillmor for 
access for more than 18 persons (as opposed to 18 hunters) in six vehicles 
during hunting season; 
4. Uphold the trial courts prohibition against use of four-wheel ATVs on the 
Perdue Creek road: and 
5. Affirm the balance of the trial court's findings, conclusions and judgment. 
DATED this ^ \ b day of April, 2004. 
Keith W. Meade 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Maceys and Family Link, L.L.C. 
Eliz^bethxT. Dunning s' \ 
Eric Gr. Maxfield J 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Attorneys for David K. Richards & Co. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this <7\\~~ day of April, 2004, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing CONSOLIDATED BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANTS/ 
APPELLEES ROBIN MACEY, KEN MACEY, FAMILY LINK, L.L.C., AND 
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AFTER RECORDING PLEASE 
MAIL TO: 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. 
P. 0. Box 130 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT 
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made 
and entered into this day of , 1985/ by 
and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ("Gillmor"), 
whose address is P. O. Box 130, Oakley, Utah 84055, and 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation 
("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North 
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116-
RECITALS: 
A. Gillmor owns certain real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Gillmor Property." 
B. Richards owns certain real property located 
adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Richards Property." 
C. Certain existing, unimproved roadways lie upon 
the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known 
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road. The parties 
""-«>*€ 
hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and under-
standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance 
of said Roads to the mutual benefit of their respective 
Properties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual 
covenants and agreements herein contained, and for other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which 
are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Easements. Richards hereby grants to 
Gillmor perpetual easements (the "Easements") over and across 
the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road from the inter-
section of said roads with State Highway 213 (known as the 
Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards Property 
described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south 
boundaries of the Gillmor Property described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes 
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained. 
2. Exclusive Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers, 
directors, invitees, agents and employees of Richards and 
Gillmor. Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not 
use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not deve4-o^- the 
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Gillmor property/in such a manner so as to subject the Ease-
ments to demands by the public for access to any portion of the 
Gillmor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is 
acknowledged by Richards that one residence may be constructed 
upon the Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such 
residence shall have the right to use the Easements for access 
to such residence. 
3. Purposes of Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
(a) General vehicular access (ingress and 
egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State 
Road 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property. Such 
access is hereby limited to access for maintenance work 
performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the 
Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek Road and Neil 
Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for recreation 
which shall include, among other things, picnicking, camping, 
hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and 
(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the 
Easements with State Road 213 and the east boundary of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal 
husbandry. 
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4. Limitations on Use of Neil Creek Road Easement. 
Notwithstanding the grant of Easement over and across the Neil 
Creek Road herein contained, Gillmor hereby agrees not to use 
the Neil Creek Road Easement except in emergency situations or 
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible. 
5. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive 
nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on 
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be 
covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant 
to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers, 
occupants and lessees of said Properties. 
6. Improvement of Purdue Creek Road Easement. The 
parties hereto recognize that certain improvements are 
necessary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable 
for the purposes herein set forth. Gillmor and Richards hereby 
agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding 
said improvements. Upon execution of this Agreement, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, the parties shall establish an 
escrow account at Continental Bank and Trust Co., and shall 
each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account. All funds 
held in such account, including interest earned on said funds, 
shall be used solely for the purpose of improving the Perdue 
Creek Road between the intersection of said Road to State 
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Highway 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property. All 
of said improvements shall be made within one (1) year from the 
date of this Agreement. Gillmor shall be responsible for 
making such improvements to the Perdue Creek Road which he 
deems, in his discretion, to be necessary or desirable in 
connection with the uses authorized herein. In the event the 
cost of making such improvements is less than $10,000, the 
parties shall share equally in all amounts remaining in the 
escrow account on the first anniversary of this Agreement. If 
the cost of improvements exceeds $10,000, Gillmor shall be 
solely responsible to pay such excess amounts. 
7. Maintenance of Easements. The parties acknowl-
edge that the periodic maintenance of the Perdue Creek Road and 
the Neil Creek Road will be necessary. Gillmor shall be 
responsible for maintaining the Perdue Creek Road Easement and 
Richards shall be responsible for maintaining the Neil Creek 
Road Easement. Thre—part-i-es—agxee—to— -sli3xe_jequa-l-l-y—i-n tlie exist 
o-f—maintaining - t-he- Perd~ue~~Creek—Road—Easements \ Ri-sb-a^ds—slia-1-1 
be—&e-l-e4y—respens-ibie -for- the~~cos~tr ~Uf—mainxa-i^ii-ng the N^ jJL, 
G*^ek—Road Easement; provided /—however-;—t-ha4^ -G-ilJjnor_sh.a_l.l„Bay 
ail—spe-cial maijii^ rLance^ -ex-pen se^s—rncriT-^ed—by—Ri-eha^d-s—-on-—the_ 
Ne44—CiLQek_JRo^d_. E a semen t__incu r-^ ed—-by-^ R-i-chaxds—a^ s~—a—reLSJLil±_o_f 
G44rlmo r ' s—use—o£—s& id—Ea-s emen fc-a^—here rn—a-14-ewe4-»-
8. Indemnification. Each party agrees to indemnify, 
defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and 
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costs, losses, liabilities, causes of actions, claims, demands, 
damages and fees, including reasonable attorneys' fees, 
incurred by either party as a result of the negligence or 
willful misconduct in the use, improvement or maintenance of 
the Easements by either party hereto. 
9. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by 
written instrument executed by both parties hereto. 
10. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be 
binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties 
hereto, their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, 
heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
11. Default. The rights and interests granted 
herein, and the limitations, covenants and conditions herein 
contained, are unique. The parties therefore agree that in the 
event of default hereunder by either party, the following 
remedies shall be available to the aggrieved party: 
(a) An action for specific performance under 
this Agreement; 
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result 
of such default; and 
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law 
or in equity. 
12. Notices. Any notices required or permitted here-
under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally 
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or when mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and 
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth 
in the first paragraph of this Agreement. 
13. Governing Law. This Agreement is made and 
entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and 
authorized officers the day and year first above written. 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC. 
By: 
DAVID K. RICHARDS 
President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
On this day of November, 1985 personally 
appeared before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., a signer of the 
within and foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF ) 
On this day of November, 1985 personally 
appeared before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly 
sworn did state that he is the President of David K. Richard & 
Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, and that the within and 
foregoing instrument was executed by authority of the By-laws 
or the Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation 
and said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 




Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33 
acres of Section 23 and the south 318.67 
acres of the west half of Section 24 and the 
east 98.2 acres of Section 34, TIN, R6E, 
SLB&M. Contains 2306.53 acres. 
EXHIBIT "B" 
RICHARDS PROPERTY 
Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Township 1 SOuthf Range 6 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian 
Section 2: All (Containing 608.45 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian 
Section 25: All (Containing 641.48 acres, 
more or less) 
Section 36: All (Containing 598.60 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian 
Section 30: All (except the East 156.05 
acres, more or less, thereof, 
particularly described as 
follows, to wit:) 
Beginning at the Northeast 
corner of said Section 30, 
Township 1 North, Range 7 
East, SLB&M, and running 
thence South 5280 feet, more 
or less, to the South 
boundary line of said Section 
30; thence West 1287.41 feet; 
thence North 5280 feet, more 
or less, to the North 
boundary line of said Section 
30; thence East 1287.41 feet, 
more or less, to the place of 
beginning. (Containing 
156.05 acres, more or less) 
Section 31: Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that 
portion of the S1/2SW1/4 and 
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that portion of the SE1/4 
lying North of the South 
right-of-way boundary line of 
Utah State Highway No. 213. 
Containing 559.89 acres, more 
or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian 
Section 24: The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of 
Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4) 
(Containing 321.12 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake 
Base & Meridian 
Section 19: The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of 
lots 1, 2, 3 and 4) except 
the East 396 feet of said 
one-half section (Containing 
270.06 acres, more or less) 
Qu>s J> 
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ALICE L. HEARST 
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OlSTRtCT O r COLUMBIA ONLY 
November 15, 1985 
L. Craig Metcalf 
WORKMAN, NYDEGGER & JENSEN 
57 West 200 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Craig: 
HAND DELIVERED 
I have reviewed the easement proposal which you 
forwarded to me in connection with the above-referenced matter. 
As I mentioned to you in our telephone conversation 
concerning the easement, it was my impression from the meeting 
that we had with you, Ross Workman and Mr. Richards on Monday, 
November 4, 1985, that Mr. Richards' main concern was the number 
of people go up onto Frank's property by using the easements. 
Frank, too, shares that concern and understands that Mr. 
Richards may like to know exactly who the people are that are 
going up there and how many there would be each year. 
Accordingly, I have redrafted the easement to provide for some 
mechanism by which Frank would provide that information to Mr. 
Richards each year. By the same token Frank feels that he could 
better patrol the hunting on his property by persons who buy 
permits from Richards to hunt on Richards' property but who 
cross over onto Frank's property to hunt. He would thus like to 
have the same type of information from Mr. Richards each year. 
In this manner I believe that they could each gain a little 
better control over who goes up onto the property. 
L. Craig Metcalf 
November 15, 1985 
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I would like to emphasize to you again and ask you to 
convey to Mr.Richards that/ like Mr. Richards, Frank is very 
interested in keeping control over who goes onto his property 
and how they get there. Mr. Richards may think that Frank is 
indiscriminate in this regard, but I can assure you that from 
everything that I have been able to learn during the preparation 
of this lawsuit, Frank is very aware at all times of who is 
going to be going up onto his property and the reasons for which 
they are going up there. I believe that if the goals of Mr. 
Richards and Frank are essentially the same, we, as artful 
draftsmen/ should be able to assist them in finding language 
which would be suitable to both of them to achieve their goals. 
As I mentioned further in our telephone conversation/ 
the easement which I have enclosed herewith attaches to the 
property. 
We will be prepared to discuss with you on Monday in 
Coalville this easement. I have stamped the easement showing 
that it is a draft. I have not been able to discuss in detail 
with Frank the wording of the easement draft which is enclosed/ 
but Frank would agree in principle to these terms. 
Sincerely/ 
y James M. Elegante 
JME:ldra 
Enclosure 
AFTER RECORDING PLEASE 
MAIL TO: 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr, 
P. 0. Box 130 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
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EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT 
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made 
and entered into this day of , 1985, by 
and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ( "Gillmor"), 
whose address is P. 0. Pox 130, Oakley, Utah 84055, and 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation 
("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North 
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
RECITALS: 
A. Gillmor owns certain real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Gillmor Property." 
B. Richards owns certain real property located 
adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Richards Property." 
C. Certain existing, unimproved roadways lie upon 
the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known 
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road. The parties 
hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and under-
standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance 
of said roads to the mutual benefit of their respective 
Properties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Easements. Richards hereby grants to 
Gillmor perpetual easements (the "Easements") over and across 
the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road from the inter-
section of said roads with State Highway 213 (known as the 
Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards Property 
described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south 
boundaries of the Gillmor Property described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes 
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained. 
2. Exclusive Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers, 
directors, invitees, agents and employees of Richards and 
Gillmor. Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not 
use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the 
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Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject 
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any por-
tion of the Gillmor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
it is acknowledged by Richards that one residence may be con-
structed upon the Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of 
such residence shall have the right to use the Easements for 
access to such residence. 
3. Purposes of Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
(a) General vehicular access (ingress and 
egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State 
Road 213 and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property. Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-
nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for 
recreation which shall include, among other things, picnicking, 
camping, hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and 
(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the 
Easements with State Road 213 and the east boundary of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal 
husbandry. 
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4 . Limitations on Use of Neil Creek Road Easement. 
Notwithstanding the grant of easement over and across the Neil 
Creek Road herein contained, Gillmor hereby agrees not to use 
the Neil Creek Road Easement except in emergency situations or 
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible. 
5. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive 
nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on 
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be 
covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant 
to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers, 
occupants and lessees of said Properties. 
6. Improvement of Perdue Creek Road Easement. The 
parties hereto recognize that certain improvements are neces-
sary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable for 
the purposes herein set forth. Gillmor and Richards hereby 
agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding 
said improvements. Upon execution of this Agreement, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable, the parties shall establish an 
escrow account at Continental Bank and Trust Co., and - shall 
each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account. All funds 
held in such account, including interest earned on said funds, 
shall be used solely for the purpose of improving the Perdue 
Creek Road between the intersection of said Road to State 
Highway 213 and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
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property. All of said improvements shall be made within one 
(1) year from the date of this Agreement. Gillmor shall be 
responsible for making such improvements to the Perdue Creek 
Road which he deems, in his discretion, to be necessary or 
desirable in connection with the uses authorized herein. In 
the event the cost of making such improvements is less than 
$10,000, the parties shall share equally in all amounts 
remaining in the escrow account on the first anniversary of 
this Agreement. If the cost of improvements exceeds $10,000, 
Gillmor shall be solely responsible to pay such excess amounts. 
7. Maintenance of Easements. The parties acknowl-
edge that the periodic maintenance of the Perdue Creek Road and 
the Neil Creek Road will be necessary. Gillmor shall be 
responsible for maintaining the Perdue Creek Road Easement and 
Richards shall be responsible for maintaining the Neil Creek 
Road Easement. Richards agrees to pay to Gillmor that portion 
of each hunting permit which Richards sells during each year 
which is designated for road maintenance and repair, which 
amount shall not be less than $20 per permit and which amount 
shall be used by Gillmor strictly for repair and maintenance of 
the Perdue Creek Road. Gillmor agrees to provide proof to 
Richards each year that the amount paid to him by Richards 
hereunder shall have been expended by Gillmor for such mainte-
nance and repair and Richards agrees to provide Gillmor proof 
of the number of hunting permits sold by him. 
8. Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees. 
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 25 persons and 
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seven vehicles to use the Easements for recreational purposes 
at any time. Gillmor further agrees that he shall provide to 
Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Ease-
ments during each year. Gillmor further agrees that he will 
require each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to dis-
play on its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to 
use the Easements. Gillmor further agrees that during the 
hunting season he will require each invitee to maintain some 
mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he 
uses the Easements. Richards agrees that he will provide to 
Gillmor a list of persons who will use the Easements for hunt-
ing purposes during the hunting season each year, and Richards 
agrees that he will require each person obtaining from Richards 
a hunting permit or hunting on Richards1 property adjacent to 
Gillmor's property with permission to carry some mark of 
identification so that he can be identified as such. Gillmor 
agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use 
any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any 
two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the 
Easements at any time, and Richards agrees that he will not 
allows use of such vehicles on the Perdue Creek Road. 
9. Indemnification. Each party agrees to indemnify, 
defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and all 
costs, losses, liabilities, causes of actions, claims, demands, 
damages and fees, including reasonable attorneys' fees, 
incurred by either party as a result of the negligence or 
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willful misconduct in the use, improvement or maintenance of 
the Easements by either party hereto. 
10. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by 
written instrument executed by both parties hereto. 
11. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be bind-
ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, 
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
12. Default. The rights and interest granted herein, 
an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained, 
are unique. The parties therefore agree that in the event of 
default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall 
be available to the aggreived party: 
(a) An action for specific performance under 
this Agreement; 
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result 
of such default; and 
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law 
or in equity. 
13. Notices. Any notices required or permitted here-
under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally 
or when mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and 
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth 
in the first paragraph of this Agreement. 
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14. Governing Law. This Agreement is made and 
entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and 
authorized officers the day and year first above written. 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC, 
By: 
DAVID K. RICHARDS 
President 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and 
foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before jne David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of David K. Richards & Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing 
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the 
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and 
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 





Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33 acres 
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the 
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres 




Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Township 1 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 2: All (Containing 608.45 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 25: All (Containing 641.48 acres, more or 
less) 
Section 36: All (Containing 598.60 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 30: All (except the East 156.05 acres, more 
or less, thereof, particularly 
described as follows, to wit:) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of 
said Section 30, Township 1 North, 
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence 
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the 
South boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North 
5280 feet, more or less, to the North 
boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. (Containing 
156.05 acres, more or less) 
Section 31: Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of 
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the 
SE1/4 lying North of the South 
right-of-way boundary line of Utah 
State Highway No. 213. Containing 
559.89 acres, more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 24: The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Mer idian 
Section 19: The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of 
said one-half section (Containing 
270.06 acres, more or less) 
AFTER RECORDING PLEASE 
MAIL TO: 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. 
P. 0. Box 130 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
//W5vf^ 
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT 
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made 
and entered into this day of , 1985, by 
and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ("Gillmor"), 
whose address is P. 0. Pox 130, Oakley, Utah 84055, and 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation 
("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North 
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
RECITALS: 
A. Gillmor owns certain real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Gillmor Property." 
B. Richards owns certain real property located 
adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Richards Property." 
C. Certain existing, unimproved roadways lie upon 
the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known 




hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and under-
standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance 
of said roads to the mutual benefit of their respective 
Properties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Easements, Richards hereby grants-—bo-—^ 
Gillmor XperpetuaiCeasements (the "Easements^) over and across 
the Perdue Creek Road land the Neil Creek Road/ from the inter-
section of said roads with State Highway 213 (known as the 
Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards Property 
described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east and south 
boundaries of the Gillmor Property described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto,^ to have and to hold the same for the purposes 
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained. 
2. Exclusive Easements^ The Easements herein 
granted *a-£-e exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee,.] and the officers, f* .^U 
directors, Jinvitees, agents and employees/ of Richards and 
Gillmor. Cillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not 
use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the 
txiA^^u ~ Li 
Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject 
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any por-
tion of the Gillmor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
it is acknowledged by Richards that^one rrridmrr m^y—be VI/OIT* 
1
 s4-«*et-ed-v-upon the Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of 
such r*ociaeiLpe shall have the right to use the Easements for 
access to such ^e^opfoc^. 
3. Purposes of Easements, The Easements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards^, which, concent .shall HUL bb1 uni easuiidbl^ 1 wi Lhhil-4^ -> —~ 
(a) CoaojaL v_ehicular access (ingress and 
egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State 
Road 213 and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property. Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-
nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for 
**/}r\ yp^creatiorr^JTxrtr^Trall iTrclude-?—among Ottrer—Hrrfrr^rpi ^ m'r^'n^ 
.vv;/\-camping,Lhunting, land f ishingXand for animal husbandry^and 
CJ"" [^, (b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the 
Easements with State Road 213 and the east .^boundarlT of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 





Limitations on Use of Neil Creek Road Easeme 
Notwithstanding the grant of easement over and across the Neil 
Creek Road herein contained,J Gillmor hereby agrees not to use 
} 
the Neil Creek Road Easement exceptALn emergency situations or 
at such times as the Perdue Creek Road is impassible./^ 
5. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive 
nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on 
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be 
covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant 
to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers, 
occupants and lessees of said Properties. 
6. Improvement of Perdue Creek Road Easement. —The, 
parties hereto recognize that cer taij^impTovements are neces-
sary to the -Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable for . 
the purposes herein set forth.
 A ^ Gillmor and Richards hereby 
agree to establish an escrow account for the purpose of funding 
said improvements. Upon execution of this Agreement, or as 
soon thereafter as practicable,%the parties shall establish an j 
escrow account at Continental Bank .and Trust Co., and • shall 
each contribute the sum of $5,000 to said account. All funds 
held in such account, including interest earned on said funds, 
shall be used solely for the purpose of improving
 N the Perdue 
Creek Road between the intersection of said Road^tb State 




property. All of said improvements shall be made within one 
(l"j year, from the date of this Agreement. Gillmor shall be 
responsible for making such improvements to the ^Befciue Creek 
Road which he deems, in his discretion^^lfo be necessary or 
desirable in connection with the^lTses authorized herein. In 
the event the cost of jnakiTng such improvements is less than 
$10,000, the parties shall share equally in all amounts 
remaining in^*the escrow account on the first anniversary of 
this Agreement. If the cost of improvements exceeds $10,000, 
Gillmor shall be solely responsible to pay such excess amounts. / 
7 . Maintenance of Easements . Thie —p-a-r-t-ies-~-a-ekxi.ow 1 -
^Jige^th-a-tr^ttre- -pe-r-io d i-c- m a in.te.nance- of -1he ~P"eT*aue~~Cf eeX"Roa~d^arTa 
t lie U-e^rl—6^-eek RJO^—Lw±l 1 b-e—n ex: e s s axy_ Gillmor -&h th£ &ei 
KY }^***^*)fi%~*' 
f^egpOTfsiLle lur\ maintaining— the Perdue Creek Road Easementrja-irek 
Richards shall be responsible for maintaining the Neil Gr^ek 
RjD^d Easement, RRichards agrees to pay to Gillmor th.a-fjzfortion 
" ^ ^ - - . . . _ ^ l — ,.....- -" /"' 
of each hunting^pe~oiit which Richards sells-'during, "each year 
which is designated for road maintenance and repair, which 
amount shall not be less than $20 per permit and which amount 
shall be used by Gillmor strictly for repair and maintenance of 
the Perdue Cceek Road. Gillmor-" agrees to provide proof to 
Richards/each year that the" amount paid to him by Richards 
hereunder shall have been expended by Gillmor for such mainte-
nance and repair\'£nd Richards agrees to provide Gillmor proof 
of the number^'of hunting permits sold by hi 
yjx" 8. Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees. 
Gil'lmor agrees that he shall not allow more t^n7)25/persons and 
,i£] 




W ^ & v /••••* *. 
•4*-
$w..&^.$f* 
^ehicles to use the Easements Ifxx-r—r-e-e-r«ea-t4-4B-a4—pru-r-ptrs^ s^  
"eft any time^^JGi2rlmor~- furt'her.. agrees that he,.- shall provid e- to 
Richards a list of pej^ so'ns whom he ^ w-rll allow to^se the Ease 
merits-- during each year./ Gillmor further agrees that he will 
:equire each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to dis-
play on its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to 
use the Easements. Gillmor further agrees that during the 
hunting season he will, require each invitee to maintain some 
mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he 
uses the Easements. I Richards agrees that he will provide to 
Gillmor a list of persons who will use the Easements for hunt^ 
ing purposes during' the hunting season each year, and Richards 
-agrees that he,-Will require each person obtaining frotff Richards 
a hunting permit or hunting on Richards1 property adjacent to 
Gillmor1s property with permission to carry some mark of 
identification so that he can be identified as su chT) Gill mor 
agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use 
any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any 
two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the 
Easements at any time^. I andK Richards ^agrees ^ that he will no 
allows use of such vehicles ,oh the.'Terdue Creek Road .1 
9. indemnification. Each^party agrees to indemnify, E 
defend and hold the other harmless from and against any and all 
costs, losses, liabilities,/causes of actions, claims, demands, 
/ 
damages and fees, including reasonable attorneys1 fees, 




willful misconduct in the use, improvement or maintenance of 
the Easements by either party hereto. j 
10. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by 
written instrument executed by both parties hereto. 
11. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be bind-
ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, 
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and assigns. 
12. Default. The rights and interest granted herein, 
an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained, 
are unique. The parties therefore agree that in the event of 
default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall 
be available to the aggreived party: 
(a) An action for specific performance under 
this Agreement; 
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result 
of such default; and 
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law 
or in equity. 
13. Notices. Any notices required or permitted here-
under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally 
or when mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and 
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth 
in the first paragraph of this Agreement. 
14. Governing Law. This Agreement is made and 
entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and 
authorized officers the day and year first above written. 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC, 
By: 
DAVID K. RICHARDS 
President 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss . 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and 
foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 




STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of David K. Richards & Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing 
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the 
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and 
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 





Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
All of Sections 26 and 25, the south 637.33 acres 
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the 
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres 




Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Township 1 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 2: All (Containing 608.45 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 25: All (Containing 641.48 acres, more or 
less) 
Section 36: All (Containing 598.60 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 30: All (except the East 156.05 acres, more 
or less, thereof, particularly 
described as follows, to wit:) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of 
said Section 30, Township 1 North, 
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence 
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the 
South boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North 
5280 feet, more or less, to the North 
boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. (Containing 
156.05 acres, more or less) 
Section 31: Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of 
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the 
SEl/4 lying North of the South 
right-of-way boundary line of Utah 
State Highway No. 213. Containing 
559.89 acres, more or less) 

Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Pase & 
Ner idian 
Section 24: The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Mer idian 
Section 19: The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of 
said one-half section (Containing 
270.06 acres, more or less) 

AFTER RECORDING PLEASE 
MAIL TO: 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr 
P. 0. Box 130 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT 
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made 
and entered into this day of , 1985, by 
and between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ("Gillmor"), 
whose address is P. 0. Box 130, Oakley, Utah 84055, and 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC., a, Utah corporation 
("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North 
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84116. 
RECITALS: 
A. Gillmor owns certain real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Gillmor Property." 
B. Richards owns certain real property located 
adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Richards Property." 
C. Certain existing, unimproved roadways lie upon 
the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known 
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road. The parties 
hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and under-
standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance 
of said roads to the mutual benefit of their respective 
Properties, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Easements, Richards hereby grants to 
Gillm<>r'^MHflflHK easement* (the "Easementji"1) over and across 
the Perdue Creek Road flMfeJHflHIIHBIIHBHHV from the inter-
section of said roads with State Highway 213 (known as the 
Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards Property 
described in Exhibit "Bn attached hereto to the east and south 
boundaries of the Gillmor Property described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for the purposes 
and subject to the conditions and limitations herein contained* 
2. Exclusive Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee,/^! 
Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not 
use yZhe Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the 
-2-
egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State 
Road 213 and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property. Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-
nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property)
 f JBfe r 
Easements with State Road 213 and the east/\boundary of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal 
husbandry. 
-3-
4 . L i m i t a t i o n s on Use of Nei l Creek Road 
i&asemei 
the Neil Creek Road 
t Gilimor hereby agrees not to use 
except 
5. Covenants to Run with the Land, The exclusive 
nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on 
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be 
H.covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant 
iu /to the Gilimor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
f\m/ described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers, 
occupants and lessees of said Properties. 
6. Improvement of Perdue Creek Road Easement, The' 
parties hereto recognize that certain* improvements are neces-
sary to the Perdue Creek Road to make such road suitable for 
the purposes herein set forth, ^±^^*^—^^ 
fighw east and south boundj 
J^ J-/- </W^*' 
_ .nt..-4?*,*?/ Jf' 
• ^ 
7. Maintenance of Easements, The parties acknowl-
edge that the periodic 
maintenance of the Perdue Cr&ek Roa 
will be necessary. Gillmor shall be 
ni^ -g- thtf Perdue C ^ 5 ® ^ e & * maintain!^ e Creek Pn.H
 P a ; - ^ 
8
* £-eslffnati0" "f ^ e of P,gom.nts bv TmHt.0fta 
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than "~ 
I persons and 
-5-
vehicles to use the Easementsi 
at any time* Gillmor further agrees that"" Tie shall provide to 
Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Ease-
ments during each year, Gillmor further agrees that he will 
require each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to dis-
play on its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to 
use the Easements. Gillmor further agrees that during the 
hunting season he will require each invitee to maintain some 
mark of identification to be displayed during the time that he 
uses the Easements. 
5eTtr ^^•M^eriffiWP 
Gillmor 
agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use 
any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any 
two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the 
Easements at any time, 
1CL Entire Agreement, This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by 
written instrument executed by both parties hereto. 
11. Binding Agreement, This Agreement shall be bind-
ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, 
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, 
personal representatives, successors and assigns, 
12. Default, The rights and interest granted herein, 
an the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained, 
are unique. The parties therefore agree that in the event of 
default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall 
be available to the aggreived party: 
(a) An action for specific performance under 
this Agreement; 
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result 
of such default; and 
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law 
or in equity. 
13. Notices, Any notices required or permitted here-
under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally 
or when mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and 
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth 
in the first paragraph of this Agreement. 
-7-
14, Governing Law, This Agreement is made and 
entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and 
authorized officers the day and year first above written. 
CHARLES P. GILLMOR, JR. 
DAVID K, RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC. 
By:_ 
DAVID K. RICHARDS 
President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and 
foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:_ 
My Commission Expires: 
-8-
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of David K. Richards & Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing 
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the 
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and 
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:_ 





Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
n 
All of Sections 26 and/25/ the south 637.33 acres 
of Section 23 and the^south 318.67 acres of the 
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres 




Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Township 1 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 2: All (Containing 608.45 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 25: All (Containing 641.48 acres, more or 
less) 
Section 36: All (Containing 598.60 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 30: All (except the East 156.05 acres, more 
or less, thereof, particularly 
described as follows, to wit:) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of 
said Section 30, Township 1 North, 
Range 7 East, SLB&M, and running thence 
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the 
South boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North 
5280 feet, more or less, to the North 
boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. (Containing 
156.05 acres, more or less) 
Section 31: Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of 
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the 
SEl/4 lying North of the South 
right-of-way boundary line of Utah 
State Highway No. 213. Containing 
559.89 acres, more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 24: The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1# 
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 19: The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of 
said one-half section (Containing 
270.06 acres, more or less) 
AFTER RECORDING PLEASE 
MAIL TO: 
Charles F. Gillmor, Jr. 
P. 0. Box 130 
Oakley, Utah 84055 
EASEMENT AND USE AGREEMENT 
This Easement and Use Agreement ("Agreement") is made 
and entered into this day of November, 19 85, by and 
between CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR., an individual ("Gillmor"), 
whose address is P. 0. Box 130, Oakley, Utah 84055, and 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC, a Utah corporation 
("Richards"), with its principal place of business at 303 North 
2370 West, Suite 200, Salt Lake City,- Utah 84116. 
RECITALS: 
A. Gillmor owns certain real property located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto and by this reference made a part hereof, hereinafter 
referred to as the "Gillmor Property," 
B. Richards owns certain real property located 
adjacent to the Gillmor Property in Summit County, State of 
Utah, described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof, which property is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Richards Property." 
C. Certain existing, unimproved roadways lie upon 
the Richards Property and the Gillmor Property commonly known 
as the Perdue Creek Road and the Neil Creek Road. The parties 
H~2-0-K~ 
hereto desire hereby to set forth their agreement and under-
standing with respect to the improvement, use and maintenance 
of said roads to the mutual benefit of their respective 
Properties. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and agreements herein contained, and for other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which are 
hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Grant of Easements, Richards hereby grants to 
Gillmor perpetual Easements (the "Easements") over and across 
the Perdue Creek Road and over and across the Neil Creek Road 
from the intersection of said roads with State Highway 213 
(known as the Weber Canyon Road) over and across the Richards 
Property described in Exhibit "B" attached hereto to the east 
and south boundaries of the Gillmor Property described in 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto, to have and to hold the same for 
the purposes and subject to the conditions and limitations 
herein contained. 
2. Exclusive easements. Except as hereinafter pro-
vided, the Easements herein granted are exclusive as to use and 
inure only to the benefit of Richards, as grantor, and Gillmor 
as grantee. Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall 
not use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agiees that he shall not allow the 
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Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject 
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any por-
tion of the Gillmor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
it is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the 
Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such cabin shall 
have the right to use the Easements for access to such cabin. 
3. Purposes of Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards. 
(a) Vehicular access (ingress and egress) 
between the intersection of the Perdue Creek Road with State 
Road 213 and over and across that portion of the Neil Creek 
Road from the point in Section 30, Range 7 East, Township 1 
North where it is joined by the Perdue Creek Road and as it 
continues in a northerly direction through Section 25, Range 6 
East, Township 1 North into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township 
1 North, and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property. Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-
nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for 
access by Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree 
of consanguinty, and their spouses and children, to the Gillmor 
property, and for animal husbandry; and 
(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the 
Perdue Creek Road with State Road 213 and over and across the 
Neil Creek Road from the point in Section 30, Range 7 East, 
Township 1 North where it is joined by the Perdue Creek Road 
and as it continues in a northerly direction through Section 
25, Range 6 East, Township 1 North into Section 24, Range 6 
East, Township 1 North, and the east and south boundaries of 
the Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not 
be limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal hus-
bandry; and 
(c) For vehicular access (ingress and egress) 
between the intersection of the Perdue Creek Road with State 
Road 213 and over and across the Neil Creek Road from the point 
in Section 25, Range 6 East, Township 1 North where it is 
joined by the Perdue Creek Road and as it continues in a 
northerly direction into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township 1 
North, and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property for Gillmor's invitees. Such access is hereby limited 
to access for maintenance work performed on the Gillmor Prop-
erty (including maintenance of the Easements and those por-
tions of the Perdue Creek road and Neil Creek road lying upon 
the Gillmor property) and for hunting; and 
(d) Vehicular access and general access for 
animal husbandry, including the herding of livestock, across 
the Neil Creek Road from the point where it is joined by the 
Perdue Creek Road in Section 30, Range 7 East, Township 1 
North, southward to its intersection with State Highway 213 for 
use in emergency situations only or with the permission of 
Richards. 
4. Covenants to Run with the Land. The exclusive 
nature of the Easements herein granted and the limitations on 
use herein contained are declared by the parties hereto to be 
covenants and restrictions which run with and are appurtenant 
to the Gillmor Property and the Richards Property, herein 
described, and shall be binding upon and shall inure to the 
benefit of all present and future owners and/or purchasers, 
occupants and lessees of said Properties. 
5. Maintenance of Easements. Gillmor shall have the 
right to maintain the Easements as necessary. Gillmor agrees 
to give Richards notice prior to undertaking any major con-
struction, other than routine maintenance, on the Easements. 
6. Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees. 
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 15 persons and 
five vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at any 
time. Gillmor agrees that he will require each vehicle using 
the Easements for hunting purposes to carry and to display on 
its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to use the 
Easements. Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and 
will not himself use any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain 
Vehicles or any two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt 
bikes" on the Easements at any time. 
7. Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the 
entire agreement of the parties hereto relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and shall not be modified or amended except by 
written instrument executed by both parties hereto. 
8. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall be bind-
ing upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto, 
their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, 
personal representatives, successors, assigns, owners, occu-
pants and lessees of the subject properties. 
9. Default. The rights and interest granted herein, 
and the limitations, covenants and conditions herein contained, 
are unique. The parties therefore agree that in the event of 
default hereunder by either party, the following remedies shall 
be available to the aggrieved party: 
(a) An action for specific performance under 
this Agreement; 
(b) An action for damages incurred as a result 
of such default; and 
(c) Any other rights or remedies provided by law 
or in equity. 
10. Notices. Any notices required or permitted here-
under shall be deemed duly delivered when delivered personally 
or when mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
certified or registered mail with return receipt requested, and 
addressed to the respective addresses for the parties set forth 
in the first paragraph of this Agreement. 
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11. Governing Law. This Agreement is made and 
entered into in the State of Utah and shall be construed and 
interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
or have caused these presents to be executed by the duly and 
authorized officers the day and year first above written. 
CHARLES F. GILLMOR, JR. 
DAVID K. RICHARDS & COMPANY, INC. 
By: 
DAVID K. RICHARDS 
President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me Charles F. Gillmor, Jr., the signer of the within and 
foregoing instrument who duly acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at:__ 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of November, 1985, personally appeared 
before me David K. Richards, who, being by me duly sworn, did 
say that he is the President of David K. Richards & Company, 
Inc., a Utah corporation, and that said within and foregoing 
instrument was executed by authority of its By-laws or the 
Resolution of the Board of Directors of said corporation and 
said David K. Richards acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: 





Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
All of Sections 26 and 35, the south 637.33 acres 
of Section 23 and the south 318.67 acres of the 
west half of Section 24 and the east 98.2 acres 





Real Property located in Summit County, 
State of Utah, and described as follows: 
Township 1 South, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 2: All (Containing 608.45 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 25: All (Containing 641.48 acres, more or 
less) 
Section 36: All (Containing 598.60 acres, more or 
less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base k 
Meridian 
Section 30: All (except the East 156.05 acres, more 
or less, thereof, particularly 
described as follows, to wit:) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of 
said Section 30, Township 1 North, 
Range 7 East, SLBStM, and running thence 
South 5280 feet, more or less, to the 
South boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence West 1287.41 feet; thence North 
5280 feet, more or less, to the North 
boundary line of said Section 30; 
thence East 1287.41 feet, more or less, 
to the place of beginning. (Containing 
156.05 acres, more or less) 
Section 31: Nl/2; N1/2SW1/4; and that portion of 
the S1/2SW1/4 and that portion of the 
SE1/4 lying North of the South right-
of-way boundary line of Utah State 
Highway No. 213. Containing 559.89 
acres, more or less) 
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Township 1 North, Range 6 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 24: The El/2 (W1/2E1/2 and all of Lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) (Containing 321.12 acres, 
more or less) 
Township 1 North, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base & 
Meridian 
Section 19: The Wl/2 (E1/2W1/2 and all of lots 1, 
2, 3 and 4) except the East 396 feet of 
said one-half section (Containing 
270.06 acres, more or less) 
11 
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2. Exclusive Easements. The Easements herein 
ited are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
Uchards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee, and the officers, 
tctors, invitees, agents and employees of Richards and 
imor. Gil loot hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not 
the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
tees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
:if ically covenants and agrees that he shall not 4e*el*f>- the 
AM.***) 
2
- Exclusive Easements. The Basements herein 
granted are exclusive as to use and inure only to the benefit 
of Richards, as grantor, Gillmor as grantee,jg 
S Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the 
2. Exclusive easements. Except as hereinafter pro-
vided, the Easements herein granted are exclusive as to use and 
inure only to the benefit of Richards, as grantor, and Gillmor 
as grantee. Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall 
not use the Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his 
invitees, agents or employees in such a manner so as to cause 
the Easements to become part of the public domain. Gillmor 
specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not allow the 
PBL000023 
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11 linor property'in such a manner so as to subject the Ease-
snts to demands by the public for access to any portion of the 
11Imor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing. it is 
:k.nowledged by Richards that one residence may be constructed 
>on the Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such 
tsidance shall have the tight to use the Easements for access 
3 such residence. 
Gillmor property to be used in such a manner BO as to subject 
the Basenents to demands by the public for access to any por-
tion of the Gilioor property. 
Gillmor property to be used in such a manner so as to subject 
the Easements to demands by the public for access to any por-
tion of the Gillmor property. Notwithstanding the foregoing, 
it is acknowledged by Richards that there is one cabin on the 
Gillmor Property, and that the occupant of such cabin shall 
have the right to use the Easements for access to such cabin. 
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3. Purposes—ft£—EJLSfimtHfc*. The Easements herein 
nted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
hards, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
3
* Purposes of Basements. The Basements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards;, r." W 
3. Purposes of Easements. The Easements herein 
granted are granted for the following purposes only and shall 
not be enlarged upon without the prior written consent of 
Richards. 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 304 
Elegante's First Draft 
11/01/85 
(a) General vehicular access (ingress and 
egress) between the intersection of the Easements with State 
Road 213 and the east boundary of the Gillmor Property. Such 
access is hereby limited to access for maintenance work 
performed on the Gillmor property (including maintenance of the 
Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek Road and Meil 
Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for recreation 
which shall include, among other things, picnicking, camping, 
hunting, and fishing, and for animal husbandry; and 
(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the hetdi»9 ©*• iiv«»cocK. insiweeii
 tiie intersection or tne 
Easements with State Road 213 and the east boundary of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 
limited to. equipment and personnel incident to animal 
husbandry. 
PBL00002' 
EASEMENT AGREEMENT f 3a 




 saasaWEgBaf vehicular accents (ingress and 
egress) between the intersection of the Basements with State 
Road 213 and the eecc and south boundaries of the Cillmor 
Property. Such access io U-ioby limited to acceii* for mainte-
nance work performed on the Cillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easement* and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road^ and Meil Cteejk. Road lying upon the Gillmor Propyl ty), JtaT 
aHBHmaaas^^ 
(b) General access for animal husbandry, includ-
ing the herding of livestock, between the intersection of the 
Easements with State Road 213 and the oast boundary of the 
Gillmor Property, which access shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, equipment and personnel incident to animal 
husbandry. 
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TRIAL EXHIBIT 1 
Final 
11/21/85 
(a) Vehicular access (ingress and egress) 
between the intersection of the Perdue Creek Road with State 
Road 213 and over and across that portion of the Meil Creek 
Road from the point in Section 30, Range 7 East, Township 1 
North where it is joined by thr> Perdue Creek Road and as it 
continues in a northerly direction through Section 25. Range 6 
East. Township 1 North into Section 24, Range 6 East, Township 
1 North, and the east and south boundaries of the Gillmor 
Property. Such access is hereby limited to access for mainte-
nance work performed on the Gillmor property (including mainte-
nance of the Easements and those portions of the Perdue Creek 
Road and Neil Creek Road lying upon the Gillmor Property), for 
access by Gillmor and his immediate family to the first degree 
of consanguinty, and their spouses and children, to the Gillmo 
property, and for animal husbandry; and 
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Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 332 
Workman Edit 
11/15/85 
8. Designation of Use of Easements by Invitees. 




vehicles to use the Easements/ 
at any time. Gillmor further agrees that he shall provide to 
Richards a list of persons whom he will allow to use the Base-
ments during each year. Gillmor further agrees that he will 
require each vehicle using the Easements to carry and to dis-
play on its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to 
use the Easements. Gillmor further agrees that during the 
hunting season he will require each invitee to maintain some 
mark of identification to b<* displayed during the time that he 
uses the Easements. 
agrees that he will not allow use of and will not himself use 
any three-wheeled motorized All Terrain Vehicles or any 
two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt bikes" on the 
.«*' 
TRIAL EXHIBIT 1 
Final 
11/21/85 
6. Des.ignaJtii2n__ot.__Uae ai toseinejifcs—by.—Lavi-t£e_s• . jrr~ JL 
Gillmor agrees that he shall not allow more than 4-9 persons and^./^/fl 
vehicles to use the Easements for hunting purposes at any 
time. Gillmor agrees that he will require each vehicle using 
the Easements Cor hunting purposes to carry and to display on 
Its windshield identification as a vehicle allowed to use the 
Easements. Gillmor agrees that he will not allow use of and 
will not himself use any thre»»-wheeled motorized All Terrain 
Vehicles or any two-wheeled motorcycles or motorized "dirt 
bikes" on the Easements at any time. ^ , ^ „^_ 
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